One of the pleasures of life is re-encountering old friends, catching up on what’s happened while your lives have gone their separate ways, reminiscing about the good old days and reconnecting. It comes back so fast, it’s like you never were apart.
Me and the Liquidating Trust had just such an experience the other day.
Sutton 58 Associates LLC v. Pilevsky et al., is a New York case which gets to the heart of the enforceability of classic single-purpose entity restrictions in commercial real estate lending. At issue is how far a third-party may go to cause a violation of a borrower’s SPE covenants, and whether those covenants are enforceable at all.
A Defaulted Construction Loan and Frustrated Attempts to Foreclose:
The Delaware Bankruptcy Court recently dismissed a Chapter 11 bankruptcy case pending before it and recognized, under Chapter 15 of the Bankruptcy Code, the debtor’s bankruptcy proceeding in Belgium. Exelco NV (“Exelco”), a Belgian diamond distributor, owed KBC Bank NV (“KBC”) approximately US$14 million. KBC’s debt was secured by a pledge on essentially all of Exelco’s assets. Exelco’s debt was also guaranteed by an affiliated company and certain individuals. When Exelco defaulted on its debt obligations, KBC commenced a sort of involuntary insolvency proceeding in Belgium.
No, says the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit in In re Cowen, adopting the minority rule and parting ways with four other Courts of Appeals.
Essentially all securitization structures utilize a bankruptcy remote entity, a/k/a special purpose entity (“SPE”), to reduce the lenders’ or investors’ exposure to a bankruptcy of the sponsor. A standard feature of SPEs is the appointment of an independent person (director, member, manager) to the body managing the SPEs. That independent person’s consent is required for “major decisions,” one of which is the filing of, or consenting to a bankruptcy of the SPE (hence the court’s reference to them as “blocking directors”).
Insider status in U.S. bankruptcy carries with it significant burdens. Insiders face a one year preference exposure rather than the 90 day period applicable to non-insiders; insiders are by definition disinterested persons and may not be retained to provide professional services and transactions among debtors and their insiders are subject to heightened scrutiny under the entire fairness doctrine.
Judge James M. Peck of the United States Bank-ruptcy Court for the Southern District of New York on December 8, 2011 issued an opinion on a motion of the Lehman Brothers Inc. (“LBI”) trustee (“Trustee”) to confirm his determination that certain claims relating to settled on delivery-versus-payment “to be announced” (“TBA”) contracts do not qualify as customer claims against the LBI estate and therefore are not entitled to Securities Investor Protection Act (“SIPA”) coverage.
Turns out, it depends on who you ask. Judge Bernstein said no. Recently, Judge Glenn said yes, but only for causes of action that resemble actual fraudulent transfers. It is unusual for the bankruptcy judges in Manhattan to disagree with each other, so let’s take a look at the issue.
Background
In a recent bench ruling, the Delaware bankruptcy court denied a motion to dismiss a chapter 11 bankruptcy filing, notwithstanding the fact that the filing contravened an express bankruptcy-filing blocking right, or “golden share,” held by certain preferred shareholders.
It is a well-established principle of bankruptcy law that claims generally crystallize as of the bankruptcy petition date. Of course, section 506(b) of the bankruptcy code allows over-secured, secured creditors to recover post-petition interest and costs, including reasonable legal fees, if their documentation provides them with the right to recover these costs. But what about unsecured creditors – are post-petition legal fees incurred by an unsecured creditor whose contract with the debtor provides for reimbursement of legal fees allowed or not?