A draft of the U.S. Treasury’s proposed debt restructuring legislation began circulating earlier today.  The draft legislation would give Puerto Rico, as well as other U.S. territories, and their municipalities access to U.S. bankruptcy court under a new chapter of the U.S. Bankruptcy Code (so-called “Super Chapter 9”) as well as making Puerto Rico’s instrumentalities (but not Puerto Rico itself) potentially eligible to file for bankruptcy under existing Chapter 9.

The Supreme Court has spoken once again on the limited jurisdiction of the bankruptcy courts, adding to the understanding derived from Northern Pipeline Constr. Co. v. Marathon Pipe Line Co., 458 U.S. 50 (1982), Granfinanciera v. Nordberg, 492 U.S. 33 (1989), Langenkamp v. Culp, 498 U.S. 42 (1990) and Stern v. Marshall, 131 S. Ct. 2594 (2011). Executive Benefits Insurance Agency v. Arkinson, Chapter 7 Trustee of the Estate of Bellingham Insurance Agency, Inc., 573 U.S.

A recent ruling in the American Airlines bankruptcy case enforcing an automatic acceleration upon bankruptcy provision serves as a reminder that the enforceability of so-called ipso facto provisions in debt instruments remains an unsettled, forum-dependent question.      

In a significant expansion of the potential risk for distressed claims traders, the Delaware bankruptcy court has recently ruled¹ that traders who engage in insider trading may have their claims subordinated to equity, and that traders who amass claims sufficient to block a plan of reorganization owe fiduciary duties to all other creditors and shareholders during plan negotiations.

Since it was issued three years ago by the Ninth Circuit Bankruptcy Appellate Panel, the Clear Channel decision (Clear Channel Outdoor, Inc. v. Knupfer (In re PW, LLC), 391 B.R. 25 (9th Cir. B.A.P. 2008)) has been widely criticized as “an aberration in well-settled bankruptcy jurisprudence.” Before Clear Channel, conventional wisdom (and what most people perceived to be the law) supported the notion that a bankruptcy sale order that contained a good faith finding under Section 363(m) could not be disturbed on appeal.

Voyager Digital Assets Inc., along with two of its affiliates, filed bankruptcy petitions in the Southern District of New York on July 5, 2022. The filing is significant—it followed months of an extreme downturn in the cryptocurrency sector which led to the collapse of Three Arrows Capital, a Singaporean cryptocurrency hedge fund (that borrowed $350 million and 15,250 Bitcoins from Voyager).

As the COVID-19 pandemic continues to disrupt businesses and markets, and companies begin to look to bankruptcy courts for relief from the resulting liquidity and operational distress, the issue of creditor and shareholder “blocking rights” seems likely to become an important topic as parties attempt to protect their investments.

The United States Supreme Court has agreed to address “[w]hether, under §365 of the Bankruptcy Code, a debtor-licensor’s ‘rejection’ of a license agreement—which ‘constitutes a breach of such contract,’ 11 U.S.C. §365(g)—terminates rights of the licensee that would survive the licensor’s breach under applicable nonbankruptcy law.” The appeal arises from a First Circuit decision, Mission Prod. Holdings, Inc. v.

In Nortel Networks, Inc., Case No. 09-0138(KG), Doc. No. 18001 (March 8, 2017), the Delaware Bankruptcy Court ruled on the objections of two noteholders who asked the Court to disallow more than $4.4 million of the $8.1 million of the fees sought by counsel to their indenture trustee. Given the detailed rulings announced by the Court, the decision may establish a number of guidelines by which future fee requests made by an indenture trustee’s professionals will be measured.

Matters Handled by the UCC

Lending credence to the old adage “if it’s too good to be true, then it probably is,” the Seventh Circuit Court of Appeals recently held that a secured lender was on inquiry notice of possible fraud by its borrower in impermissibly pledging customers’ assets to secure loans. And the penalty was steep—the Court determined the pledge to be a fraudulent transfer to the lender and the lender’s failure to act upon inquiry notice destroyed the lender’s good faith defense. As a result, the lender’s $300 million secured claim was reduced to a near-worthless general unsecured claim.