The U.S. Supreme Court’s decision in Wellness International Network Ltd. v. Sharif confirms the long-held and common sense belief that “knowing and voluntary consent” is the key to the exercise of judicial authority by a bankruptcy court judge.1 In short, the Supreme Court held that a litigant in a bankruptcy court can consent—expressly or impliedly through waiver—to the bankruptcy court’s final adjudication of claims that the bankruptcy court otherwise lacks constitutional authority to finally decide.

As the market for so-called “unitranche” credit facilities continues to increase, the Delaware Bankruptcy Court had an opportunity recently to answer positively the question of whether bankruptcy courts will enforce the Agreement Among Lenders (“AAL”) (a form of intercreditor agreement) used in such structures.

Today, the Supreme Court issued a decision in Bank of America, N.A. v.

Those words are from Justice Sotomayor’s opinion in the recent decision by the Supreme Court in Wellness International Network, Ltd. v. Sharif, which decision has generated significant press coverage (and blog postings) among bankruptcy practitioners across the country. This author certainly doesn’t intend to add to the noise out there by reciting the facts and procedural history of the case yet again.

In the past decade, Chapter 11 practice has witnessed the rise of a new phenomenon: structured dismissals.¹ Broadly speaking, the term structured dismissal is an umbrella term for a dismissal order that includes additional bells and whistles, such as releases, protocols for claims administration or provisions permitting the gifting of assets to junior stakeholders. Like a Chapter 11 plan, a structured dismissal often identifies how proceeds are to be distributed while retaining jurisdiction in the bankruptcy court for claims administration and other specified matters.

Today, we follow up on our earlier post where we reviewed the United States Bankruptcy Court for the District of Delaware’s decision in Energy Future Holdings

In a memorandum decision dated May 4, 2015, Judge Vincent L. Briccetti of the United States District Court for the Southern District of New York affirmed the September 2014 decision of Judge Robert D. Drain of the United States Bankruptcy Court for the Southern District of New York, confirming the joint plans of reorganization (the “Plan”) in the Chapter 11 cases of MPM Silicones LLC and its affiliates (“Momentive”). Appeals were taken on three separate parts of Judge Drain’s confirmation decision, each of which ultimately was affirmed by the district court:

Nearly four years after its decision in Stern v. Marshall raised new doubts about the place of bankruptcy courts in our legal system, the Supreme Court has finally put those doubts to rest. This week, in Wellness International Network, Ltd. v. Sharif, No. 13-935, the Court held that even for claims that must otherwise be resolved by an Article III court, a bankruptcy court may still adjudicate the matter based on consent.

A collective sigh of relief was the main effect of this week’s much-awaited Supreme Court decision on bankruptcy jurisdiction in Wellness International Network, Ltd. v. Sharif, No. 13-935, ___ U.S.___ (May 26, 2015, Sotomayor, J.). While a number of minor issues remain, the majority’s ruling that bankruptcy judges can issue judgments and final orders with the parties’ consent means that the current bankruptcy system can continue to function normally.

Recently, several courts across the country have considered whether filing a proof of claim on debt that is barred by the statute of limitations violates the Fair Debt Collection Practices Act (“FDCPA”). The increased attention on this issue was sparked by the Eleventh Circuit’s decision in Crawford v. LVNV Funding, LLC, 758 F.3d 1254 (11th Cir. 2014). The Eleventh Circuit held that filing a proof of claim on debt that is barred by the applicable statute of limitations violates the FDCPA.