No matter your industry or line of business, insolvency is not a pleasant process. Debts stack up, paperwork starts flying back and forth, and creditors circle their wagons. But it may surprise even a seasoned corporate attorney when one debtor in particular comes calling: The federal government.

The law that makes it possible — and pushes Uncle Sam to the front of the creditor line — is the Federal Priority Act. The statute dates back centuries, but is little-known among today’s practitioners. And that’s not a good thing.

In a 6-3 ruling, the U.S. Supreme Court held that bankruptcy courts have the authority to adjudicate Stern claims so long as the litigant parties provide “knowing and voluntary consent.”  This decision in Wellness International Network, et. al. v. Richard Sharif  provides much needed guidance as to the breadth and applicability of the Supreme Court’s 2011 decision in Stern v.

This morning, the United States Supreme Court ruled that debtors in Chapter 7 bankruptcy cases cannot “strip off,” or completely void, junior mortgages that—based on the value of the property and the amount of claims secured by senior mortgages—are completely underwater.

Much has been written in the past several years regarding the scope of a bankruptcy court’s jurisdiction in the wake of the Supreme Court’s decisions in Stern v. Marshall, 564 U.S. ___ (2011) and Executive Benefits Ins. Agency v. Arkison, 573 U.S. ___ (2014). Now, the Supreme Court has weighed in again in the case of Wellness Int’l Network, Ltd., et al v. Sharif, 575 U.S. ___ (2015) in an attempt to clarify the confusion created by Stern.

This week’s unanimous Supreme Court decision barring the strip off of wholly unsecured junior liens in chapter 7 cases is one of the stranger recent opinions of the Court.  See Bank of America, N.A. v. Caulkett, No. 13-1421, ___ U.S. ___ (June 1, 2015).  While the result is not particularly surprising, what is unusual is that the Court goes out of its way to question its two decades old decision inDewsnup and may even be hinting that it is ready to overrule that decision.  See Dewsnup v. Timm,502 U.S. 410 (1992).

In today’s economic environment, the rights of secured creditors have become a hot topic around the figurative dinner table of bankruptcy professionals.  Inevitably, this conversation includes a discussion of those Bankruptcy Code provisions intended to protect the rights of secured creditors, including:

On May 26, 2015, the United States Supreme Court ruled that Article III of the U.S. Constitution is not violated when bankruptcy courts decide matters with the knowing and voluntary consent of the litigants.  Wellness Int’l Network, Ltd. v. Sharif,No. 13-935 (U.S. May 26, 2015).

How far do the Bankruptcy Code’s “safe harbor” provisions extend in the commercial mortgage-backed securitization (CMBS) market? Do these safe harbor provisions protect financial institutions that act merely as conduits for CMBS payments? These questions were addressed recently by the Northern District of Illinois District Court, and the court’s decision provides ammunition for CMBS investors in clawback claims brought by a bankruptcy trustee.

Section 506(a) of the Bankruptcy Code provides that a creditor’s claim is a “secured claim to the extent of the value of such creditor’s interest in the estate’s interest in such property”—that is, it is a secured claim for an amount equal to the present value of the collateral—and is an “unsecured claim” for the remainder. Section 506(d) provides that, “[t]o the extent that a lien secures a claim against the debtor that is not an allowed secured claim, such lien is void.”

A bankruptcy case^[1] (no surprise) has produced another instructive court ruling on post-acceleration enforceability of a prepayment (make-whole) premium provision contained in a debt instrument. This latest lesson comes via the U.S. District Court for the Southern District of New York, affirming a ruling of that district’s U.S.