In a ruling that comes as a blow to organized labor and a boon to employers in bankruptcy, the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit recently broke new appellate ground in holding that Section 1113 of the Bankruptcy Code permits debtors to reject the terms and conditions of an expired collective bargaining agreement (CBA).
The U.S. Bankruptcy Court for the Southern District of Florida recently denied a mortgagee's motion to reopen a Chapter 7 case to compel the surrender of real property, citing a five-year delay in filing the motion.
In so ruling, the Court agreed with an earlier ruling from the U.S. Bankruptcy Court for the Middle District of Florida (In re Plummer, 513 B.R. 135 (Bankr. M.D. Fla. 2014)), distinguishing "surrender" from "foreclosure," and holding that a creditor cannot use the Bankruptcy Code to circumvent the obligations imposed by state law.
(E.D. Ky. Feb. 5, 2016)
The district court denies the motion for stay pending the appeal of the bankruptcy court’s order. The bankruptcy court had ordered that the party moving to reopen the bankruptcy case deposit funds into escrow as a condition to reopening the case. The court held that the party must show at a minimum serious questions going to the merits to obtain such a stay, but the party failed to do so. Opinion below.
The Supreme Court’s decision last term in Baker Botts v. Asarco, in which the Court ruled that professionals that are paid from a debtor’s bankruptcy estate cannot be compensated for time spent defending their fee applications, continues to rankle bankruptcy practitioners. Moreover, a recent decision in a Delaware bankruptcy case shows that the impact of Asarco will not be easily circumvented.
For the past several years, creditors in the Ninth Circuit were confounded by an interpretation of the bankruptcy code that permitted individual chapter 11 debtors to retain a significant portion of their assets without creditor consent. The problem was particularly vexing in the context of high net worth individuals, some of whom held multiple ownership interests in entities that held valuable assets or generated significant income. That loophole was finally closed on January 28, 2016 when the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals determined that the “absolute priority rule” applies i
In Travelers Cas. & Sur. Co. of America v. Pacific Gas and Elec. Co., 549 U.S. 443 (2007), the U.S. Supreme Court rejected the Ninth Circuit’s long-standing Fobian rule disallowing claims against a bankruptcy estate for attorney’s fees arising from litigating issues that are “peculiar to federal bankruptcy law,” rather than basic contract enforcement. In so ruling, the Court recognized the presumption that “claims enforceable under applicable state law will be allowed in bankruptcy unless they are expressly disallowed.”
When it comes to releases, plan proponents generally agree the broader the better. But when plan proponents include far reaching and all-encompassing language in hopes of securing a release for every possible claim under the sun, they sometimes overlook the very claims for which they may actual want a release. This was the case in a recent decision,
Section 547(c)(2) of the Bankruptcy Code excepts from the trustee’s power to avoid preferential transfers any transaction in which the debtor transfers property to a creditor in the “ordinary course of business.” Exactly what constitutes “ordinary course of business,” however, is not a settled question of law. In Jubber v. SMC Electrical Products (In re C.W. Mining Co.), 798 F.3d 983 (10th Cir. 2015), the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit considered whether a first-time transaction between a debtor and a creditor can satisfy the ordinary course exception.