Both the First Energy Solutions and PG&E bankruptcies have seen proceedings regarding power purchase and similar agreements (PPAs) that raise this question.

Background

Contracts often contain provisions that enable a party to terminate or modify the contract based on the other party's bankruptcy filing, insolvency or deteriorating financial condition. In general, the Bankruptcy Code renders these types of provisions (sometimes referred to as "ipso facto" clauses) ineffective. Specifically, under section 365(e)(1) of the Bankruptcy Code (emphasis added):

Recently, the Second Circuit became the first federal circuit court to rule that the federal government could deny a Paycheck Protection Program (“PPP”) loan to a debtor in bankruptcy solely because of an applicant’s bankruptcy status.[1] Prior to the Second Circuit’s decision in Springfield Hospital, Inc. v.

In a March 2021 decision in the jointly administered bankruptcy cases of Fencepost Productions, Inc. and certain of its affiliates, Judge Dale L.

In its October 22, 2020, CNH Diversified Opportunities Master Account, L.P. v.

After months of speculation, it is now official : PG&E (both the parent, PG&E Corporation, and its subsidiary, Pacific Gas & Electric Company), having faced extraordinary challenges relating to catastrophic wildfires in 2017 and 2018, has announced that a voluntary bankruptcy filing “is appropriate, necessary and in the best interests of all stakeholders, including wildfire claimants, PG&E’s other creditors and shareholders, and is ultimately the only viable option to restore PG&E’s financial stability to fund ongoing operations and provide safe service to customers.” As

In its January 14, 2022 decision in In re Wolfson, the United States Bankruptcy Court for the District of Delaware discharged Chapter 7 debtor Ryan K.

In its recent opinion arising out of the Orexigen Therapeutics Inc.

Can state regulatory agencies move ahead with lawsuits against businesses who file for bankruptcy in order to enforce consumer protection and business laws, or does the automatic stay’s broad injunctive sweep capture those actions? The answer depends on whether the state is acting in its regulatory capacity or simply like another creditor – and the distinction is not always clear.

Merit Management Group, LP v. FTI Consulting, Inc., No. 16-784 (2018)