The Supreme Court of NSW in Citadel Financial Corporation Pty Ltd [2020] NSWSC 886 has made orders (in accordance with section 447A(2(b) of the Corporations Act 2001 (Cth)) to terminate a deed of company arrangement (DOCA) on grounds that entry into such DOCA was an abuse of the voluntary administration process.

In our April newsletter, we noted that the UK Government had announced proposed changes to insolvency laws.  On 20 May 2020, the Corporate Insolvency and Governance Bill (UK) was introduced.  The proposed reforms include:

Regan v Brougham [2019] NZCA 401 clarifies what is needed to establish a valid guarantee.

A Term Loan Agreement was entered into whereby Christine Regan and Mark Tuffin lent $50,000 to B & R Enterprises Ltd. Rachael Dey and Bryce Brougham were named as Guarantors. Bryce Brougham was the only guarantor to sign the agreement. The Company was put into liquidation and a demand made against the Guarantor.

The guarantor argued that the guarantee was not enforceable based on the following:

North Harbour Motors Limited (in liquidation) (North Harbour) issued a statutory demand against Moffat Road Limited (Moffat) in respect of two separate $30,000 deposits paid by North Harbour to Moffat on the purchase of two properties pursuant to agreements for sale and purchase dated 6 July 2015 (the Agreements).

In New Zealand, a court may appoint a liquidator to a company if, among other reasons, it is satisfied that the company is unable to pay its debts.[1] Unlike other jurisdictions, that assessment is focused only on cashflow, rather than balance sheet, insolvency.

The Commissioner of Inland Revenue (Commissioner) appealed a decision of Associate Judge Christiansen to approve a payment proposal by Mr Wilson to discharge a debt he owed the Commissioner and thereby avoid a declaration of bankruptcy. 

In 2008, Harvey, an experienced businessman, guaranteed a debt owed to Dunbar Assets plc (Dunbar).  Dunbar subsequently served a statutory demand on Harvey in 2011 for payment under the guarantee.

In 2012, Harvey applied, unsuccessfully, to set aside the demand in the County Court on the ground of promissory estoppel.  However, the demand was subsequently set aside by the Court of Appeal on a completely unrelated ground.

In Mclean v Trustees of the Bankruptcy Estate of Dent [2016] EWHC 2650, the High Court considered the application of the equitable doctrines of marshalling and subrogation in relation to a fixed charge over (among other things) a dog.

A company and partnership borrowed funds from two sources – Barclays Bank and Lady Morrison. Barclays held, among other things, charges over farms owned by individual partners and an agricultural charge under the Agricultural Credits Act 1928 (UK), including a charge over a dog. Lady Morrison only held charges over the farms.

In Madsen-Ries & Anor v Donovan Drainage and Earthmoving Limited [2016] NZCA 301, the liquidators of a failed property development company, Te Pua, applied to set aside as insolvent transactions a number of payments which Te Pua made to a drainage contractor, Donovan. 

In Ebert Construction Ltd v Sanson [2016] NZHC 472, the High Court awarded costs to liquidators after a statutory demand issued by the liquidators had been set aside by consent.  The reasons were as follows: