To promote equal treatment of creditors, the US Congress has armed debtors with the power to bring suit to recover a variety of pre-bankruptcy transfers. Prominent among these is a debtor’s ability under Section 548 of the Bankruptcy Code to recover constructively fraudulent transfers — i.e., transfers made without fair consideration when a debtor is insolvent.

In In re KB Toys Inc.,¹ the US Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit affirmed the holdings of the lower courts that claims subject to disallowance under Section 502(d) of the Bankruptcy Code are “similarly disallowable in the hands of the subsequent transferee.” According to the Third Circuit, when a creditor owes property to the estate, until that property is returned to the estate, that creditor’s claim, regardless of who holds it, is impaired, and the subsequent sale of that claim cannot ri

In a decision that will be of great interest to the creditor community, the US Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit held, on November 5, 2009, that the Bankruptcy Code does not bar an unsecured claim for post-petition attorneys’ fees that was authorized under a valid prepetition contract. The case, Ogle v. Fidelity & Deposit Company of Maryland,1 extends and clarifies the US Supreme Court’s March 2007 decision in the Travelers case,2 which opened the door for such a ruling.

On April 16, 2013, in Morning Mist Holdings Ltd. v. Krys (In re Fairfield Sentry Ltd.),¹ the US Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit issued an important decision informing fundamental concepts of cross-border insolvency law as implemented pursuant to Chapter 15 of the Bankruptcy Code.

The U.S. Supreme Court has ruled that a secured creditor cannot be denied its right to “credit bid”—i.e., to offset the amount of its debt against the purchase price of assets, rather than bidding in cash—in sales of collateral undertaken in connection with plans of reorganization under Chapter 11 of the Bankruptcy Code. In so ruling, the Court resolved a widely publicized split of authority among the Circuit Courts of Appeal, and rejected the Third Circuit’s ruling in the Philadelphia Newspapers case.¹

On May 15, 2012, the Eleventh Circuit Court of Appeals (the “Circuit Court”) issued an opinion in In re TOUSA, Inc.,¹ in which it affirmed the original decision of the bankruptcy court and reversed the appellate decision of the district court. After a 13-day trial, the bankruptcy court had found that liens granted by certain TOUSA subsidiaries (the “Conveying Subsidiaries”) to secure new loans (the “New Term Loans”) incurred to pay off preexisting indebtedness to certain lenders (the “Transeastern Lenders”) were avoidable fraudulent transfers.

On April 19, 2012, the Lehman bankruptcy court handed down its decision on the long-pending motion to dismiss filed by JPMorgan Chase Bank, N.A., in response to Lehman Brothers Holdings Inc.’s $8.6 billion avoidance action against it. The action sought to recover the value of collateral taken by JP Morgan in its role as principal clearing bank to Lehman in the run-up to the Lehman insolvency.

On December 19, 2019, the US Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit held in In re Millennium Lab Holdings II, LLC¹that bankruptcy courts have the constitutional authority, well within the constraints of Stern v.

The Bankruptcy Court for the District of Massachusetts recently issued an opinion in In re SW Boston Hotel Venture, LLC¹ in which it found, among other things, that the assignment of voting rights from a junior creditor to a senior creditor pursuant to an intercreditor agreement was unenforceable. The opinion was rendered in connection with the court’s decision to confirm the plan proposed by the debtor, the owner of the W Hotel in Boston.

Background

On November 26, 2019, the US Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit held in Ultra Petroleum Corp. v.