In its recently issued decision in Husky International Electronics, Inc. v. Ritz, a 7-1 majority of the Supreme Court has clarified that intentionally fraudulent transfers designed to hinder or defraud creditors can fall within the definition of “actual fraud” under Section 523(a)(2)(A) of the Bankruptcy Code and can sometimes result in corresponding liabilities being non-dischargeable in a personal bankruptcy proceeding.1
On May 16, 2016, the U.S. Supreme Court decided Husky International Electronics, Inc. v. Ritz, No. 15-145, holding that the "actual fraud" bar to discharge under section 523(a)(2)(A) of the Bankruptcy Code encompasses an individual debtor's knowing receipt of fraudulently transferred property.
Statutory Background
On May 16, 2016, the Supreme Court of the United States handed down its opinion in Husky International Electronics, Inc. v. Ritz, Case No. 15-145.
Husky Int’l Electronics, Inc. v. Ritz, No. 15-145
Debtors seek the protections of the Bankruptcy Code to have their debts discharged, but there are exceptions. A creditor can prohibit discharge of a debt “obtained by … actual fraud.” 11 U.S.C. § 523(a)(2)(A). Today, in a 7-1 decision written by Justice Sotomayor, the Supreme Court ruled that a fraudulent conveyance qualifies as “actual fraud.”
A Supreme Court ruling this week should give creditors a powerful tool to collect their debts from debtors who try to transfer assets before seeking bankruptcy protection. The primary reason an individual may turn to personal bankruptcy is to protect assets from creditor collection while obtaining a “discharge” from debts. Such protection is increasingly necessary where an individual is being pursued by one or more creditors, particularly where those creditors may have obtained (or are about to obtain) judgments against the individual.
Facts
The respondents applied to set aside an order permitting the liquidators to serve the ‘Main Application’ on the respondents out of the jurisdiction (‘Set Aside Application’). Grounds of the application were: (i) the liquidators could not establish a serious issue to be tried/ reasonable prospect of success on the Main Application; and (ii) the initial without notice application had been procured by misrepresentation and/or material non-disclosure.
In June 2016, after a period of experimentation, the SFO promulgated an amended set of policies concerning the exercise of its power to conduct compelled interviews under Section 2 (s2) of the Criminal Justice Act 1987 (CJA). Part of this package is a document entitled “Presence of an interviewee’s legal adviser at a section 2 interview”. This expounds the SFO’s view as to their proper role whilst attending a s2 interview with their interviewee client.
Facts
The husband and wife were directors and shareholders of a company (‘C’). The husband was adjudged bankrupt in June 2014; the petitioners were appointed as his trustees in bankruptcy. Among the assets vested in the trustees under s 306 of the Insolvency Act 1986 (IA 1986), was the husband’s shareholding in C. However, the trustees were not registered as members of C until March 2015.
The Commercial Court recently held that the Defendant, a former majority beneficial owner of the Claimant bank, had acted dishonestly and in breach of duties owed to the Claimant in causing the Claimant to advance monies in eight transactions which had not been repaid or recovered, to a borrower closely connected to the Defendant
Background
Facts
The company (‘Goldtrail’) was a tour operator. The director, who owned 100% of the company, had attempted to sell 50% of his shares to each of two companies without one knowing about the other. Goldtrail went into liquidation leaving passengers stranded overseas and owing £20m for repatriation.