The Finance Act 2020 provides that directors, managers, shareholders, lenders and others can be made jointly and severally liable for the outstanding tax debts of insolvent (or potentially insolvent) companies and limited liability partnerships (LLPs).

A recent bankruptcy court decision out of the United States Bankruptcy Court for the Central District of California, In re Verity Health Sys. of Cal., Inc., Case No. 2:18-bk-20151 (ER) (Bankr. C.D. Cal. Nov. 27, 2019), is a good reminder of how difficult it is for a purchaser under an asset purchase agreement to get out of the deal by invoking a Material Adverse Effect clause (also known as a Material Adverse Change clause) (an “MAE”).

All too often the task of procuring and renewing D&O insurance at a portfolio company is assigned to the portfolio company’s CFO or Controller, who employs an insurance broker to find the best price for the amount of coverage deemed appropriate by the broker. When such insurance is procured and thereafter renewed, the CFO/Controller simply reports to the board the fact of the procurement/renewal and few questions about the terms of coverage are discussed at the board level. This can be a big mistake.

In the recent decision William R. Lee Irrevocable Trust v. Lee (In re Lee), the Seventh Circuit Court of Appeals affirmed a bankruptcy court’s decision (also affirmed by the district court) piercing a non-debtor’s corporate veil and allowing a creditor of the non-debtor to participate in the bankruptcy of the corporation’s individual shareholder.

Yesterday, the United States Supreme Court, in Merit Management Group, LP v. FTI Consulting, Inc., Case No. 16-784, ruled that the “securities safe harbor” under section 546(e) of the Bankruptcy Code, 11 U.S.C. §§ 101-1532, does not shield transferees from liability simply because a particular transaction was routed through a financial intermediary—so-called “conduit transactions.”

Recoupment is an equitable remedy – not expressly addressed in the Bankruptcy Code – that permits the offset of mutual debts arising out of the same transaction or occurrence. Unlike typical setoff, if recoupment applies, prepetition debts can be set off against postpetition debts. A recent decision from the Delaware bankruptcy court demonstrates that the availability of recoupment often depends on how the court defines the contours of the “same transaction or occurrence” requirement.

In Through the Looking Glass, Lewis Carroll’s sequel to Alice’s Adventures in Wonderland, there is a famous exchange between Humpty Dumpty and Alice regarding the meaning of words. Toward the end of that dialogue, Alice asked Humpty Dumpty what he meant by the word “impenetrability.” Humpty Dumpty’s response was to not only give the word a meaning that would not be found in any dictionary, but to also expand the meaning he gave the word so that it required affirmative action on Alice’s part.

“The world is full of obvious things which nobody by any chance ever observes.”

Sherlock Holmes

The preparation and filing of a debtor’s schedules of assets and liabilities is a routine but important aspect of nearly every bankruptcy case. A debtor’s schedules provide critical information to creditors and other parties in interest, the Office of the United States Trustee, and the bankruptcy court.

Today we’ll begin with a two-part question: When do you suppose you could (i) hold a debtor’s property hostage without running afoul of the automatic stay and (ii) also collect on an administrative expense for postpetition rent for leased space used to store such property?

If you don’t already know the answers to the above questions, perhaps an overview of a recent decision from the Bankruptcy Court for the District of New Jersey will provide some insight.