Earlier today, the FDIC announced that the FDIC Board of Directors voted on Friday, October 8, 2010 to approve the issuance of a notice of proposed rulemaking (NPR) regarding the treatment of certain creditor claims under the FDIC’s new orderly liquidation authority established under Title II of the

COSTELLO v. GRUNDON (October 18, 2010)

On August 4, 2010, the New Jersey Superior Court, Appellate Division extended equitable principles previously applied in mortgage foreclosure cases to how far an unsecured judgment creditor could go to satisfy its lien against a debtor, deciding to follow a line of cases standing for the principal that “even in the absence of express statutory authorization, a court has inherent equitable authority to allow a fair market value credit in order to prevent a double recovery by a creditor against a debtor.” Moreover, in the case, MMU of New York, Inc. v.

Most polls, political pundits, and crystal balls are predicting a larger crowd on the Republican side of the aisle after the midterm elections, potentially giving them a majority in the House and tightening the margin in the Senate. The natural question that follows is what will happen to Dodd-Frank if the composition of Congress changes significantly? Is it possible that with a Republican majority the House may seek to repeal one of the most controversial pieces of legislation enacted by the Obama administration?

On October 8, 2010, the FDIC approved a Proposed Rule that would implement certain provisions of its authority granted by Congress in Title II of the Dodd-Frank Act (“Title II”) to act as receiver for covered financial companies (failing financial companies that pose significant risks to the financial stability of the United States) when a Bankruptcy Code proceeding is found to be inappropriate. Prior to the enactment of the Dodd‑Frank Act on July 21, 2010, no unified statutory scheme for the orderly liquidation of covered financial companies existed.

A New York bankruptcy judge held on October 4, 2010, that second lien lenders could object to a debtor’s bid procedures approved by the first lien lenders despite the terms of an intercreditor agreement inIn re Boston Generating, LLC, No. 10-14419 (SCC) (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. Oct. 4, 2010).1 The intercreditor agreement provided the first lien lenders with the “exclusive right to…make determinations regarding the…sale” of the collateral. According to the court, however, the agreement did not expressly preclude the second lien lenders from objecting to bid procedures.

The following is a list of some recent larger U.S. bankruptcy filings in various industries. To the extent you are a creditor to any of these debtors, or other entities which may have filed for bankruptcy protection, you as a creditor are entitled to certain protections under the Bankruptcy Code.

ADVERTISING

Advertising firm Vertis Holdings Inc. has landed in bankruptcy court for a second time, filing a prepackaged Chapter 11.

PUBLISHING

The current cycle of Chapter 11 corporate bankruptcies involves many cases where the debtor seeks to achieve a balance-sheet restructuring by converting debt into equity. When consensus cannot be achieved, junior stakeholders (i.e., second lien creditors, unsecured creditors and/or equity) will often contest plan confirmation on the grounds that the proposed plan provides more than 100% recovery to the senior creditors. Valuation plays the central role in these cases.

The U.S. Bankruptcy Code provides for the appointment of a bankruptcy examiner to investigate the debtor with respect to allegations of fraud, dishonesty, incompetence, misconduct or mismanagement. The right examiner, with a clearly defined mission, will have a major influence on the bankruptcy process. The difference between a successful financial restructuring or liquidation-resulting in substantial recoveries for the key constituencies-and a time-consuming (and asset-consuming) meltdown, can depend on the approach of the examiner and the examiner's support team.

Introduction

Earlier this month, the chapter 11 trustee (the "Trustee") in the DBSI bankruptcy began filing adversary actions seeking the avoidance and recovery of alleged fraudulent transfers. The Trustee filed the adversary actions against various defendants, some of whom the Trustee identifies as "John Doe 1 -10." This post will look briefly at the DBSI bankruptcy proceeding, why DBSI filed for bankruptcy, as well as some of the events that have transpired since the compnay filed for bankruptcy.

Background