Two recent cases serve as reminders the devil is truly in the details.

(Bankr. S.D. Ind. July 29, 2016)

The bankruptcy court denies the debtor’s motion to transfer venue of his chapter 7 bankruptcy case from the Terra Haute Division to the Evansville Division. The debtor failed to satisfy the standard set forth in 28 U.S.C. § 1412 for venue transfer. The debtor’s travel time to each court location was virtually the same, and thus Evansville was no more convenient than Terra Haute. Further, there was no showing that the interests of justice would be better served by the transfer. Opinion below.

Judge: Graham

(Bankr. W.D. Ky. Aug. 2, 2016)

(7th Cir. July 27, 2016)

The Seventh Circuit affirms the bankruptcy court’s order finding that the debtor’s prepetition transfer of a farm to the defendant was a fraudulent transfer subject to avoidance. The debtor transferred the farm in exchange for the defendant’s agreement to abandon litigation he had brought against the debtor. The bankruptcy court found that the debtor did not receive reasonably equivalent value in exchange for the farm. Opinion below.

Per Curiam

Defendant: Pro Se

Attorney for Trustee: Brenda L. Zeddun

In Rosenberg v. DVI Receivables XIV, LLC, 818 F.3d 1283 (11th Cir. 2016) (No. 14-14620), plaintiff filed an adversary complaint against defendants under the section of the Bankruptcy Code, 11 U.S.C.

The power of a bankruptcy court to authorize the sale of assets “free-and-clear” of liens and any other interests is a powerful tool that is used to realize value from distressed businesses. Indeed, purchasers will occasionally insist that sellers file a chapter 11 case in order to “cleanse the assets” by conducting their sale under Bankruptcy Code § 363(b). But how far does this power reach? Can bankruptcy be used to protect the purchaser from potential successor liability claims?

Last week, our post “You Can’t Always Get What You Want” discussed a Texas bankruptcy court decision rejecting efforts by debtor Sam Wyly to claim as exempt a number of offshore private annuities.

Recently, in GSE Environmental, Inc. v. Sorrentino (In re GSE Environmental, Inc.), on a motion for judgment on the pleadings, the Bankruptcy Court for the District of Delaware held that the Chief Executive Officer’s claim for unpaid compensation payable in stock constituted an equity security rather than a general unsecured claim.

The United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit recently articulated a standard to determine what claims may be barred against a purchaser of assets "free and clear" of claims pursuant to section 363(f) of the Bankruptcy Code and highlighted procedural due process concerns with respect to enforcement.¹  The decision arose out of litigation regarding certain defects, including the well-known "ignition switch defect," affecting certain GM vehicles.  GM's successor (which acquired GM's assets in a section 363 sale in 2009) asserted that a "free and clear" provisi

The Supreme Court again will be addressing the powers of bankruptcy courts. At the end of the term, the Court granted certiorari in Czyzewski v. Jevic Holding Corp. to decide whether a bankruptcy court may authorize the distribution of settlement proceeds in a way that violates the statutory priority scheme in the Bankruptcy Code. No. 15-649, 2016 WL 3496769 (S. Ct. June 28, 2016). The Supreme Court is expected to address this fundamental bankruptcy issue sometime early next year.

Background