The power of a bankruptcy court to authorize the sale of assets “free-and-clear” of liens and any other interests is a powerful tool that is used to realize value from distressed businesses. Indeed, purchasers will occasionally insist that sellers file a chapter 11 case in order to “cleanse the assets” by conducting their sale under Bankruptcy Code § 363(b). But how far does this power reach? Can bankruptcy be used to protect the purchaser from potential successor liability claims?
Last week, our post “You Can’t Always Get What You Want” discussed a Texas bankruptcy court decision rejecting efforts by debtor Sam Wyly to claim as exempt a number of offshore private annuities.
Recently, in GSE Environmental, Inc. v. Sorrentino (In re GSE Environmental, Inc.), on a motion for judgment on the pleadings, the Bankruptcy Court for the District of Delaware held that the Chief Executive Officer’s claim for unpaid compensation payable in stock constituted an equity security rather than a general unsecured claim.
The United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit recently articulated a standard to determine what claims may be barred against a purchaser of assets "free and clear" of claims pursuant to section 363(f) of the Bankruptcy Code and highlighted procedural due process concerns with respect to enforcement.1 The decision arose out of litigation regarding certain defects, including the well-known "ignition switch defect," affecting certain GM vehicles. GM's successor (which acquired GM's assets in a section 363 sale in 2009) asserted that a "free and clear" provisi
The Supreme Court again will be addressing the powers of bankruptcy courts. At the end of the term, the Court granted certiorari in Czyzewski v. Jevic Holding Corp. to decide whether a bankruptcy court may authorize the distribution of settlement proceeds in a way that violates the statutory priority scheme in the Bankruptcy Code. No. 15-649, 2016 WL 3496769 (S. Ct. June 28, 2016). The Supreme Court is expected to address this fundamental bankruptcy issue sometime early next year.
Background
(7th Cir. July 26, 2016)
The Seventh Circuit interprets a Wisconsin exemption statute applicable to annuity contracts. The statute provides that such a contract is exempt from assets available to creditors so long as it “complies with the provisions of the internal revenue code.” The trustee argued for a narrow interpretation of this language, while the Court ultimately agrees with the broader interpretation of the statute employed by Wisconsin bankruptcy courts. Opinion below.
Judge: Hamilton
Attorney for Debtors: Dewitt Ross & Stevens S.C., Craig E. Stevenson
The collapse of marine fuel trader OW Bunker & Trading A/S (“OW Bunker”) and its affiliates, in November 2014, has resulted in a blizzard of legal proceedings in the United States. Bunker suppliers and creditors of insolvent OW Bunker entities have sought to secure their claims by arresting vessels or proceeding directly against vessel owners and operators who contracted with OW Bunker entities to supply their vessels with bunkers.
Under Section 363(f) of the Bankruptcy Code, a debtor or trustee can sell estate assets “free and clear of any interest” in such assets. This short, simple string of six words represents one of the most powerful tools in the bankruptcy professional’s arsenal.
The scope of the Bankruptcy Code’s safe harbor for certain financial contracts has been tested again, this time in the United States Bankruptcy Court for the Western District of Louisiana. The question this time was whether an ipso facto provision continues to be safe harbored if enforcement of that provision is conditioned on other factors – in this case, the debtor’s failure to perform under the contract.
The bankruptcy courts have a long history of being willing to use their judicial power under the Bankruptcy Code to prevent perceived efforts by debtors to inappropriately shield their assets from creditors. This is true even when the debtors employ structures and devices that are complex and crafted in seeming compliance with applicable law.