The decision of the United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit in In re Motors Liquidation Company is yet the latest case to show the difficulty in using the bankruptcy process to resolve tort claims.[1]

The Background Basics

Wednesday, February 1 brought a welcome development for the many correspondent lenders currently defending against claims filed by (or threatened with future lawsuits by) Residential Funding Company (“RFC”) and its successor-in-interest, the ResCap Liquidating Trust (“ResCap”).

In chapter 11 bankruptcy cases, it is not uncommon for secured parties/lenders to provide a “carve-out” for various professional fees. Frequently there may be a “carve-out” for “all chapter 11 professionals” or the “carve-out” may be broken out in different amounts for the debtor’s professionals as opposed to, for example, Creditors’ Committee professionals. These “carve-outs” can often be in a Cash Collateral Order (assuming the debtor is using the secured party’s collateral) or in a DIP Order (debtor-in-possession financing). So what does a carve-out mean?

(Bankr. W.D. Ky. Feb. 1, 2017)

The bankruptcy court denies the creditor’s request for default rate interest on the secured claim. The value of the real property securing the claim was in excess of the claim amount. Case law establishes that there is a presumption in favor of the contractual rate of interest, but it is subject to rebuttal when evidence establishes the default rate is significantly higher without justification. Here, the default rate doubled the non-default rate and the court finds there was no justification under the evidence presented. Opinion below.

(Bankr. S.D. Ind. Feb. 2, 2017)

The bankruptcy court makes additional findings of fact following the appeal and remand. The court’s original judgment stands, as the court concludes again that the plaintiff failed to prove that the debtor should have known of the fraud committed with his accounts. Opinion below

Prior opinion summary: click here

Judge: Carr

In the recent decision ofSpizz v. Goldfarb Seligman & Co. (In re Ampal-American Israel Corp.), 2017 WL 75750 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. Jan.

In chapter 11 reorganizations, Federal Rule of Bankruptcy Procedure 3003(c)(3) provides that “[t]he court shall fix and for cause shown may extend the time within which proofs of claim or interest may be filed” (commonly known as the bar date). For a creditor or interest holder to be subject to this bar date, they must have received notice to satisfy due process. A known creditor, one that is reasonably ascertainable, must receive “actual notice.” Simply receiving a court-approved bar date notice from the debtor is enough to satisfy this requirement for due process.

Judge Christopher Sontchi recently issued an important opinion in the Molycorp chapter 11 case.

Addressing a circuit split over a trademark licensee’s rights following a debtor/licensor’s bankruptcy, the US Bankruptcy Appellate Panel (BAP) for the First Circuit held that, although trademarks and trade names are not included in bankruptcy law’s definition of “intellectual property,” the licensee’s rights to use the licensor’s trademarks as set forth in the agreement were not terminated by the debtor’s rejection of the agreement. Mission Prod. Holdings, Inc. v. Tempnology LLC, Case No. 15-065 (BAP, 1st Cir., 2016) (Hoffman, J).

Roust Corporation (“Roust”) caught everyone’s attention when, on January 6, 2017, Southern District of New York Bankruptcy Judge Robert Drain held a joint first day and confirmation hearing and confirmed the prepackaged plan of reorganization of Roust Corporation and certain affiliates (collectively, the “Debtors”) only six (6) days after the Debtors commenced their chapter 11 cases. In re Roust Corporation, et al., Ch. 11 Case No. 16-23786 (RDD) (Bankr. S.D.NY. Dec. 30, 2016). You’re a seasoned bankruptcy attorney.