In a decision that reaffirms its previous rulings on the jurisdictional limits of bankruptcy courts, the US Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit recently held in W.R. Grace & Co. v. Chakarian (In re W.R. Grace & Co.)1 that bankruptcy courts lack subject matter jurisdiction over third-party actions against non-debtors if such actions could affect a debtor’s bankruptcy estate only following the filing of another lawsuit.
Taggart v. Lorenzen, No. 18-489
Today, the Supreme Court held 9-0 that a creditor cannot be held in contempt of court for violating a bankruptcy discharge order if there is a “fair ground of doubt” as to whether the order barred the creditor’s conduct.
In the course of the next few weeks, Omega Navigation Enterprises, Inc. and its affiliates (collectively, “Omega”), an international shipping enterprise, will find out if motions by certain of their lenders to, among other things, dismiss Omega’s chapter 11 bankruptcy proceedings have been granted by the U.S. Bankruptcy Court for the Southern District of Texas.1 If not, then Omega may be permitted to continue its attempt to reorganize its business under chapter 11 of the Bankruptcy Code.
A recent decision by the US District Court for the Southern District of New York regarding the terms of an engagement letter demonstrates the need to clearly articulate the intended purpose and scope of an engagement. As the case described below demonstrates, if there is any ambiguity with regard to whether or not a fee must be paid and/or when an engagement is terminated, the resolution of such ambiguity may depend upon the description of the engagement’s purpose.
Both the First Energy Solutions and PG&E bankruptcies have seen proceedings regarding power purchase and similar agreements (PPAs) that raise this question.
Background
Contracts often contain provisions that enable a party to terminate or modify the contract based on the other party's bankruptcy filing, insolvency or deteriorating financial condition. In general, the Bankruptcy Code renders these types of provisions (sometimes referred to as "ipso facto" clauses) ineffective. Specifically, under section 365(e)(1) of the Bankruptcy Code (emphasis added):
The Bankruptcy Court for the District of Massachusetts recently issued an opinion in In re SW Boston Hotel Venture, LLC1 in which it found, among other things, that the assignment of voting rights from a junior creditor to a senior creditor pursuant to an intercreditor agreement was unenforceable. The opinion was rendered in connection with the court’s decision to confirm the plan proposed by the debtor, the owner of the W Hotel in Boston.
Background
To promote equal treatment of creditors, the US Congress has armed debtors with the power to bring suit to recover a variety of pre-bankruptcy transfers. Prominent among these is a debtor’s ability under Section 548 of the Bankruptcy Code to recover constructively fraudulent transfers — i.e., transfers made without fair consideration when a debtor is insolvent.
In a recent decision that will be of interest to capital and structured finance market participants,1 a bankruptcy court in the Southern District of New York found that nonrecourse noteholders of a structured finance vehicle were not eligible petitioners under § 303(b) of the Bankruptcy Code and therefore could not commence an involuntary bankruptcy case.
The Bankruptcy Court for the Southern District of New York has held that a cross-affiliate netting provision in an ISDA swap agreement is unenforceable in bankruptcy. In the SIPA proceedings of Lehman Brothers Inc. (LBI), UBS AG (UBS) sought to offset UBS’s obligation to return excess collateral to LBI against claims purportedly owed by LBI to UBS subsidiaries, UBS Securities and UBS Financial Services.
To promote equal treatment of creditors, the US Congress has armed debtors with the power to bring suit to recover a variety of pre-bankruptcy transfers. Prominent among these is a debtor’s ability under Section 548 of the Bankruptcy Code to recover constructively fraudulent transfers — i.e., transfers made without fair consideration when a debtor is insolvent.