The U.S. Court of Appeals for the First Circuit held on June 23, 2011, that junior creditors could receive a distribution over the objection of senior creditors who claimed they were entitled to post-petition interest under contractual subordination provisions. In re Bank of New England Corporation, ___ F.3d ___, 2011 WL 2476470 (1st Cir. June 23, 2011). In reaching its decision, based on the bankruptcy court's fact findings, the court stressed "that the parties did not intend to subordinate the Junior Noteholders to post-petition interest."Id. at *5.

In a recent decision, the United States Bankruptcy Court for the District of Delaware (the “Bankruptcy Court”) granted protection over the U.S. assets of a Cayman Islands exempted company in liquidation. See Revised Order Recognizing Foreign Proceeding (the “Order”), In re Saad Investments Finance Company (No.5) Limited (“SIFCO5”), Case No. 09-13985 (KG) (Bankr. D. Del. Dec. 17, 2009) (Docket No. 47). The company, SIFCO5, is subject to official liquidation proceedings in the Cayman Islands, which the Bankruptcy Court found was eligible for relief under chapter 15 of the U.S.

The U.S. Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit held on July 15, 2008, that a major creditor with a seat on the debtor’s board of directors and a 10.6% equity interest was not an insider in a bankruptcy preference suit. In re U.S. Medical, Inc., 2008 WL2736658 (10th Cir. 7/15/08).

“… [A]ny sale of [a foreign] debtor[’s] property [in the U.S.] outside of the ordinary course of business can be approved by the bankruptcy court only after notice, hearing, and a finding of good business reasons to permit the sale,” held the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit on May 22, 2017. In re Fairfield Sentry Ltd. (“Sentry II”), 2017 U.S. App. LEXIS 8860, at *11 (2d Cir. May 22, 2017).

On Aug.

The U.S. Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit held on March 1, 2013, that a bankruptcy court had not erred in applying a prime plus 1.75 percent interest rate to a secured lender’s $39 million claim under a "cramdown" plan of reorganization. Wells Fargo Bank N.A v. Texas Grand Prairie Hotel Realty, LLC (In the Matter of Texas Grand Prairie Hotel Realty, LLC), __ F.3d __, 2013 WL 776317 (5th Cir. Mar. 1, 2013).

On June 28, 2011, the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit held that secured creditors have a statutory right to credit bid1 their debt at an asset sale conducted under a "cramdown" plan. In re River Road Hotel Partners, LLC, ___ F.3d. ___, 2011 WL 2547615 (7th Cir. June 28, 2011).2 The Seventh Circuit's decision creates a split with recent decisions in the Third and Fifth Circuits regarding a lender's ability to credit bid its secured debt. See In re Philadelphia Newspapers, 599 F.3d 298 (3d Cir. 2010); In re Pacific Lumber, Co., 584 F.3d 229 (5th Cir.

The U.S. Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit held on Nov. 3, 2009, that a district court had improperly dismissed, on mootness grounds, an appeal from a bankruptcy court’s order confirming a reorganization plan. According to the Tenth Circuit, the appeal was reviewable because reversal of the plan confirmation order (1) would not unduly affect innocent third parties, and (2) would not undo any complex transactions.

The Ninth Circuit held on July 3, 2008, that an oversecured creditor’s claim for payment was entitled to a “presumption in favor of the loan agreement’s default rate (an additional 2% interest), subject only to reduction based upon any equities involved.” General Elec. Capt’l Corp. v. Future Media Productions, Inc., 2008 WL2610459, *2 (9th Cir. 7/3/08). Reversing the lower courts, the Court of Appeals held that the bankruptcy court had improperly applied a questionable Ninth Circuit precedent when denying the lender a default rate of interest. Id., at *4.

The Third Circuit recently affirmed the bankruptcy court's approved retention of the debtor's counsel ("S") when that "law firm dropped an existing client to avoid conflicts that would prevent it from taking on a more lucrative client [i.e., the debtor]." In re Boy Scouts of America, 2022 WL 1634643, *7 (3d Cir. May 24, 2022) (BSA). According to the court, there were "not enough facts to put [the so-called "hot potato" doctrine] into play" and disqualify S under the Rules of Professional Conduct. Id.