The Bankruptcy Code sets forth the relative priority of claims against a debtor and the waterfall in which such claims are typically paid. In order for a court to confirm a plan over a dissenting class of creditors – what is commonly called a “cram-down” – the Bankruptcy Code demands thateither (i) the dissenting class receives the full value of its claim, or (ii) no classes junior to that class receive any property under the plan on account of their junior claims or interests. This is known as the “absolute priority rule.”
On August 20, the U.S. Bankruptcy Court for the Central District of Illinois in In re I80 Equipment, LLC, No.17-81749, 2018 WL 4006294 (Bankr. C.D. Ill. Aug. 20, 2018) held that a secured party failed to perfect its security interest due to an insufficient description of the collateral listed in its UCC-1 financing statement. The financing statement failed to sufficiently describe the collateral because it referenced the definition of “collateral” in the underlying security agreement without attaching the security agreement to the financing statement.
The Bankruptcy Appellate Panel for the Sixth Circuit (BAP) recently held that a mortgagee that held a collateral assignment of rents on property in which the debtor had no equity was not adequately protected by cash collateral orders entered by the bankruptcy court that granted the lender a "replacement lien" on post-petition rents.
WTE-S&S AG Enters., LLC v. GHD, Inc., 2017 Bankr. LEXIS 2343 (Bankr. N. D. Ill. August 18, 2017)
In nearly every bankruptcy proceeding there is some constituency that ends up having its claim or interest impaired. Not surprisingly, therefore, these same constituencies would like to avoid that outcome by restricting the debtor’s ability to commence bankruptcy in the first place.
On September 18, in an en banc review, the Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit overruled, in part, seminal casesBarger v. City of Cartersville, 348 F.3d 1289 (11th Cir. 2003) and Burnes v. Pemco Aeroplex, Inc., 291 F.3d 1282 (11th Cir. 2002), adopting a totality-of-the-circumstances analysis when facing questions of judicial estoppel.
Olsen v. Heaver (In re Heaver), 473 B.R. 734 (Bankr. N.D. Ill. 2012) –
The short story is that when a deed and mortgage are executed at the same time, but the mortgage is recorded before the deed, the recorded mortgage does not provide constructive notice and can be avoided in a bankruptcy – at least under Illinois law as interpreted by the Heaver bankruptcy court.