On June 23, 2011, the US Supreme Court issued a narrowly-divided decision in Stern v. Marshall, limiting Bankruptcy Court jurisdiction over certain types of claims. The Court found that while the Bankruptcy Court was statutorily authorized to enter final judgment on a tortious interference counterclaim (as a core proceeding under 28 U.S.C. § 157(b)(2)(C)), it was not constitutionally authorized to do so.
Introduction
The United States Supreme Court recently ruled in Stern v. Marshall1 that a bankruptcy court lacks constitutional authority to render a final judgment on a bankruptcy estate’s counterclaim against a creditor based on state common law, despite an express statutory grant of jurisdiction. This ruling is the most significant decision regarding bankruptcy court jurisdiction since the Court’s 1982 decision in Northern Pipeline v. Marathon2 and it could significantly affect the administration of bankruptcy cases.
Root of the Constitutional Problem
During her lifetime, Vickie Lynn Marshall, publicly known as Anna Nicole Smith (“Vickie”), was hardly a stranger to the prying eyes of the media. Today, the late Vickie is again the subject of media coverage, this time in the context of a fifteen-year legal saga that has twice reached the United States Supreme Court.
On June 28th, the Bankruptcy Court overseeing the liquidation of Bernard Madoff's broker-dealer ruled that investors in funds that in turn invested with Madoff are not claimants within the meaning of the Securities Investor Protection Act. SIPC v. Bernard L. Madoff Investment Securities LLC. See also Reuters.
The US Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit recently held that redemptions of commercial paper made through the Depositary Trust Company (DTC) are entitled to the “safe harbor” protections afforded to settlement payments under Bankruptcy Code Section 546(e), and are, therefore, not preferential transfers, even though such payments were made prior to maturity.1 The Second Circuit is the first Circuit Court of Appeal to address the issue, which arises out of the Enron bankruptcy case.
Legal Framework
Since it was issued three years ago by the Ninth Circuit Bankruptcy Appellate Panel, the Clear Channel decision (Clear Channel Outdoor, Inc. v. Knupfer (In re PW, LLC), 391 B.R. 25 (9th Cir. B.A.P. 2008)) has been widely criticized as “an aberration in well-settled bankruptcy jurisprudence.” Before Clear Channel, conventional wisdom (and what most people perceived to be the law) supported the notion that a bankruptcy sale order that contained a good faith finding under Section 363(m) could not be disturbed on appeal.
A consortium uniting Apple, Inc. and Microsoft with other top players in the software, electronics and wireless handset industries outplayed Google in a bankruptcy court auction for Nortel’s patent portfolio, posting a winning offer of $4.5 billion for the trove of 6,000 patents that cover fourth-generation wireless, data networking, Internet, and semiconductor technologies.
On June 21, 2011, the Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals ruled in In re Evans Industries, Inc., that a purchaser of assets from a bankrupt company cannot make a claim against a holdback escrow account for expenses incurred while cleaning up hazardous waste that the bankrupt company left behind. Pursuant to an asset purchase agreement, Grief Industrial Packaging and Services purchased five facilities from Evans Industries, Incorporated.
The Bottom Line: