Summary

The US Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit has weighed in on the question of whether a secured creditor’s ability to credit bid—to offset the amount of the creditor’s debt against the purchase price of sale assets rather than bid in cash—is a right guaranteed by statute even in “cramdown” plans of reorganization conducted under Chapter 11 of the Bankruptcy Code. On June 28, 2011, the court ruled in favor of secured creditors with its much anticipated decision in In re River Road Hotel Partners, LLC (River Road).1

The U.S. Court of Appeals for the First Circuit held on June 23, 2011, that junior creditors could receive a distribution over the objection of senior creditors who claimed they were entitled to post-petition interest under contractual subordination provisions. In re Bank of New England Corporation, ___ F.3d ___, 2011 WL 2476470 (1st Cir. June 23, 2011). In reaching its decision, based on the bankruptcy court's fact findings, the court stressed "that the parties did not intend to subordinate the Junior Noteholders to post-petition interest."Id. at *5.

The United States Court of Appeals for the First Circuit upheld a bankruptcy court’s ruling that, where subordination agreements lacked explicit provisions addressing the payment of post-petition interest on senior unsecured debt, the agreements were ambiguous, and an inquiry into the parties’ intent was required. After probing the facts and analyzing New York law, the bankruptcy court determined that the contracting parties did not intend to subordinate the junior unsecured debt to post-petition interest on the senior debt.

Background

On June 23, 2011, the US Supreme Court issued a narrowly-divided decision in Stern v. Marshall, limiting Bankruptcy Court jurisdiction over certain types of claims. The Court found that while the Bankruptcy Court was statutorily authorized to enter final judgment on a tortious interference counterclaim (as a core proceeding under 28 U.S.C. § 157(b)(2)(C)), it was not constitutionally authorized to do so.

Introduction

The United States Supreme Court recently ruled in Stern v. Marshall1 that a bankruptcy court lacks constitutional authority to render a final judgment on a bankruptcy estate’s counterclaim against a creditor based on state common law, despite an express statutory grant of jurisdiction. This ruling is the most significant decision regarding bankruptcy court jurisdiction since the Court’s 1982 decision in Northern Pipeline v. Marathon2 and it could significantly affect the administration of bankruptcy cases.

Root of the Constitutional Problem

During her lifetime, Vickie Lynn Marshall, publicly known as Anna Nicole Smith (“Vickie”), was hardly a stranger to the prying eyes of the media. Today, the late Vickie is again the subject of media coverage, this time in the context of a fifteen-year legal saga that has twice reached the United States Supreme Court.

A consortium uniting Apple, Inc. and Microsoft with other top players in the software, electronics and wireless handset industries outplayed Google in a bankruptcy court auction for Nortel’s patent portfolio, posting a winning offer of $4.5 billion for the trove of 6,000 patents that cover fourth-generation wireless, data networking, Internet, and semiconductor technologies.

On June 28th, the Bankruptcy Court overseeing the liquidation of Bernard Madoff's broker-dealer ruled that investors in funds that in turn invested with Madoff are not claimants within the meaning of the Securities Investor Protection Act. SIPC v. Bernard L. Madoff Investment Securities LLC. See also Reuters.