The United States Court of Appeals for the First Circuit upheld a bankruptcy court’s ruling that, where subordination agreements lacked explicit provisions addressing the payment of post-petition interest on senior unsecured debt, the agreements were ambiguous, and an inquiry into the parties’ intent was required. After probing the facts and analyzing New York law, the bankruptcy court determined that the contracting parties did not intend to subordinate the junior unsecured debt to post-petition interest on the senior debt.

Background

In a recent holding that a creditor may collect, on an unsecured basis, post-petition attorneys’ fees under an otherwise enforceable pre-petition contract, the Second Circuit Court of Appeals followed a similar ruling by the Ninth Circuit earlier this year, adding to a conflict among the circuits on this issue.

On June 23rd, the First Circuit addressed the priority of claims asserted by senior noteholders and junior noteholders of debt issued by an insolvent bank. It affirmed the bankruptcy court's finding that the parties did not intend for the senior noteholders to receive post-petition interest payments prior to the junior noteholders receiving a distribution. In re: Bank of New England Corporation, Debtor.  

On November 12th, the Third Circuit affirmed both bankruptcy and district court findings that, under the Rooker-Feldman doctrine, federal courts lacked subject matter jurisdiction over a claim seeking rescission of a mortgage filed in an adversarial action in federal bankruptcy court after a state court entered a default foreclosure order on that mortgage. The Third Circuit held further that the entry of summary judgment against plaintiff on her Truth in Lending Act claim was proper.

On April 12th, a federal district court addressed the in pari delicto defense, including the sole actor exception to the adverse interest exception. In the instant case, a litigation trust created in bankruptcy court to pursue the debtor's claims sued Credit Suisse for allegedly assisting the debtor's founders' looting of the debtor's subsidiaries. Credit Suisse sought summary judgment, asserting the in pari delicto defense. The Court agreed, finding that the evidence supported the conclusion that the founders so dominated the subsidiaries that the subsidiaries lacked a separate existence.

On April 7th, a federal bankruptcy court sanctioned Lender Processing Services, Inc., a home foreclosure service provider against whom the Federal Reserve Board and OCC have initiated enforcement action. The opinion explains LPS's business model and that model's failings, and cites case law documenting LPS's historic shortcomings. It reminds litigants that proving a default is the lender's, not counsel's, responsibility. In re Ron Wilson, Sr.  

The United States Supreme Court (the “Court”) recently issued a long-awaited decision in Czyzewski v. Jevic Holding Corp. (“Jevic”), which limits the use of “structured dismissals” in Chapter 11 bankruptcy cases, requiring structured dismissals pursuant to which final distributions are made to comply with the Bankruptcy Code’s priority scheme, or the consent of all affected parties to be obtained.1

What is a Structured Dismissal?

On February 22nd, the Bankruptcy Court overseeing the liquidation of Lehman Brothers' broker-dealer business denied motions seeking to modify the order approving the sale of the business to Barclays Capital. The Court noted the extraordinary circumstances surrounding the sale, the affirmance of that sale order, and movants' failure to challenge the order for one year. The court held that even if the evidence presented here were known in 2008, the result would have been the same, i.e., the sale would have been approved.

Nearly four years after its decision in Stern v. Marshall raised new doubts about the place of bankruptcy courts in our legal system, the Supreme Court has finally put those doubts to rest. This week, in Wellness International Network, Ltd. v. Sharif, No. 13-935, the Court held that even for claims that must otherwise be resolved by an Article III court, a bankruptcy court may still adjudicate the matter based on consent.

The United States District Court for the Southern District of Florida has reversed a bankruptcy court order that had required a group of lenders (“Transeastern Lenders”) to disgorge, as a fraudulent transfer, approximately $421 million paid to them by a joint venture partner (“TOUSA”) in satisfaction of their legitimate, uncontested loans to the joint venture that TOUSA had guaranteed. Together with pre-judgment interest, the total amount to be paid by the Transeastern Lenders was in excess of $480 million.