On April 18, 2007, in Fla. Dep’t. of Rev. v. Piccadilly Cafeterias, Inc. (In re Piccadilly Cafeterias, Inc.),1 the United States Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit held that the stamp tax exemption of 11 USC § 1146(c)2 may apply to transfers of assets that were necessary to the consummation of a bankruptcy plan of reorganization and were made prior to confirmation of the plan. In reaching this decision, the Eleventh Circuit declined to follow decisions of the Third and Fourth Circuits to the contrary and thus created a split among the circuits on this issue.

On August 2, 2010, Maru E. Johansen, in her capacity as the foreign representative (the “Foreign Representative”)1 in respect of Mexican insolvency proceedings regarding Compania Mexicana de Aviacion, S.A. de C.V. (“Mexicana”), filed a petition for recognition in the United States Bankruptcy Court for the Southern District of New York (the “Bankruptcy Court”), commencing a case under Chapter 15 of the United States Bankruptcy Code.2 Mexicana and its affiliates operate Mexicana Airlines, Mexico’s largest airline.

In response to the increasing complexity of cross-border restructurings and liquidations, a new chapter (Chapter 15) was added to the US Bankruptcy Code in 2005. Chapter 15 is meant to provide a framework for effectively and efficiently dealing with cross-border insolvency proceedings involving the United States by providing the representative of a foreign insolvency case with certain benefits and protections.

In a recent decision by the Bankruptcy Court for the Southern District of Texas, In re Scotia Development, LLC,1 Judge Richard S. Schmidt denied the motions of several creditors and the State of California seeking transfer of venue from the Southern District of Texas to the Northern District of California, finding that venue was proper in Texas and that California would not be a more convenient forum for the financial restructuring of the debtors.

Background

On June 2, 2010, the Third Circuit overruled longstanding precedent interpreting the definition of a “claim” under the Bankruptcy Code. In JELD-WEN, Inc. v. Van Brunt (In re Grossman’s Inc.), No. 09-1563, slip op., (3d Cir. June 2, 2010) an en banc panel rejected the state law accrual theory of claims recognition established in Avellino & Bienes v. M. Frenville Co. (Matter of M. Frenville Co.), 744 F.2d 332 (3d Cir. 1984), in favor of the more widely followed conduct test theory.

Do officers of a public corporation have an affirmative obligation to monitor corporate affairs? Yes, according to Judge Walsh in his recently issued memorandum opinion in Miller v. McDonald (In re World Health Alternatives, Inc.).1 Although "Caremark" oversight liability had previously generally only been imposed on directors of public corporations, the Bankruptcy Court for the District of Delaware determined that officers are not immune from such liability as a matter of law.

In re Adelphia Communications Corp.,1 the United States Bankruptcy Court for the Southern District of New York recently held that neither a creditor’s aggressive litigation tactics resulting in the creditor’s prospective receipt under a proposed plan of special consideration for voting in favor of the plan, which special consideration other members of the same class that voted against the plan would not obtain, nor the creditor’s ownership of claims in several debtors, in a multi-debtor Chapter 11 case, was a sufficient basis for the “draconian sanction” of disallowing such creditor’s votes

Companies that plan to sell goods or services to a debtor in bankruptcy should be aware of a recent case decided by the Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit, holding that a trustee may avoid a debtor’s post-petition transfers of cash collateral if such transfers were made without the consent of the secured party or court order.1

With US Circuit Courts split on the issue of whether bankruptcy courts have the power to release third parties from creditors’ claims without the creditors’ consent, a move known as non-consensual third-party release, the Seventh Circuit recently weighed in the affirmative in In re Airadigm Communications, Inc.1 With the split widening between the circuits on this matter, it seems more likely than ever that the Supreme Court could weigh in on and decide this critical issue to lenders and others.2

Equitable mootness is a doctrine grounded in equity pursuant to which an appeals court will dismiss an appeal of a bankruptcy order — even if effective relief could conceivably have been granted — because the implementation of such relief (e.g., the reversal of a bankruptcy court order) would be inequitable to third parties. This doctrine may be applied to achieve the necessary finality of bankruptcy orders and decisions that is required to effectuate the successful, expedient reorganization of debtors in bankruptcy.2