There are numerous reasons why a company might use more than one entity for its operations or organization: to silo liabilities, for tax advantages, to accommodate a lender, or for general organizational purposes. Simply forming a separate entity, however, is not enough. Corporate formalities must be followed or a court could effectively collapse the separate entities into one. A recent opinion by the United States Bankruptcy Court for the District of Massachusetts, Lassman v.

The bankruptcy court in the City of Harrisburg's Chapter 9 proceeding held a hearing on Tuesday, November 1 on the Mayor’s motion for an order clarifying that the City had the ability to pay its debts in the ordinary course.  The court found that given the limitation on its jurisdiction under Chapter 9 of the Bankruptcy Code and given that Bankruptcy Code Section 363 (which deals with generally with the use, sale or lease of property) is not incorporated into Chapter 9, the City does have the authority to pay its vendors in the ordinary course, including vendors with amounts owed

The Supreme Court has spoken once again on the limited jurisdiction of the bankruptcy courts, adding to the understanding derived from Northern Pipeline Constr. Co. v. Marathon Pipe Line Co., 458 U.S. 50 (1982), Granfinanciera v. Nordberg, 492 U.S. 33 (1989), Langenkamp v. Culp, 498 U.S. 42 (1990) and Stern v. Marshall, 131 S. Ct. 2594 (2011). Executive Benefits Insurance Agency v. Arkinson, Chapter 7 Trustee of the Estate of Bellingham Insurance Agency, Inc., 573 U.S.

As expected a number of objections to the Chapter 9 bankruptcy petition filed by the Harrisburg city council were filed on Friday October 28, the deadline set by the Bankruptcy Court for such objections. As expected both the Commonwealth of Pennsylvania and the Harrisburg Mayor’s Office filed objections.

In a recent decision by the United States Bankruptcy Court for the Southern District of New York, Weisfelner, v. Fund 1, et al. (In re Lyondell Chem. Co.), 2014 Bankr. LEXIS 159 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y.

The Bankruptcy Court held a status conference in the Harrisburg Chapter 9 earlier today.  The principal purpose of the hearing was for the court to set a schedule for objections to Harrisburg’s chapter 9 eligibility.  Objections to eligibility and supporting briefs are to be filed by October 28, a response by the City Council is to be filed by November 7, and replies on behalf of the objecting parties are to be filed by November 12.  The judge made it clear that the City Council has the burden of showing eligibility.  Th

A Delaware bankruptcy court recently limited a secured creditor’s right to credit bid an acquired claim to the purchase price of that claim. In In re Fisker Auto. Holdings, Inc., 2014 Bankr. LEXIS 230 (Bankr. D. Del. January 17, 2014), the United States Bankruptcy Court for the District of Delaware addressed a motion by Fisker Automotive, Inc. (“Fisker”) to sell substantially all of its assets (the “Sale Motion”) to Hybrid Tech Holdings, LLC (“Hybrid”).

In a decision that may have implications for holders of community development district bonds and other similar “dirt bonds,” a Florida bankruptcy court has ruled that holders of community development district bonds do not always have plan voting rights when the underlying developer — as opposed to the development district itself — is the bankruptcy debtor.

In a recent advisory, we reported on an apparently favorable decision to secured creditors from the Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals that held that a secured creditor’s claim survives bankruptcy where the secured creditor received notice of the case and was found to have not actively participated in it.

Since it was issued three years ago by the Ninth Circuit Bankruptcy Appellate Panel, the Clear Channel decision (Clear Channel Outdoor, Inc. v. Knupfer (In re PW, LLC), 391 B.R. 25 (9th Cir. B.A.P. 2008)) has been widely criticized as “an aberration in well-settled bankruptcy jurisprudence.” Before Clear Channel, conventional wisdom (and what most people perceived to be the law) supported the notion that a bankruptcy sale order that contained a good faith finding under Section 363(m) could not be disturbed on appeal.