In the case of Florida Dept. of Revenue v. Piccadilly Cafeterias, Inc.,1 the United States Supreme Court ruled that the exemption from the payment of stamp taxes or similar taxes on transfers of property of a Chapter 11 debtor’s estate, contained in section 1146(a) of the Bankruptcy Code,2 does not apply to transfers of property made before a Chapter 11 plan is confirmed.
In a recent decision, the United States Supreme Court resolved a circuit split regarding the meaning of the statutory phrase "under a plan confirmed under [Chapter 11] of the bankruptcy Code," as codified in 11 U.S.C. § 1146(a). The case arose from the bankruptcy of Piccadilly Cafeterias, Inc. At one time among the nation's most successful cafeteria chains, Piccadilly had fallen on hard financial times. In 2003, Piccadilly filed for Chapter 11 bankruptcy protection in the Southern District of Florida.
The New York Insurance Department, as Liquidator of Nassau Insurance Company, pursued Jeanne Diloreto for 20 years to recover what it contended were assets diverted from Nassau, recovering a judgment in state court that it attempt to execute upon. Superintendent DiNallo ended up filing an involuntary bankruptcy petition against Ms. Diloreto, which was dismissed, in part based upon procedural infirmities.
In Giant Eagle, Inc. v. Phar-Mor, Inc.,1 the United States Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit held that a lessor-claimant whose lease was rejected pursuant to section 365(a) of Title 11 of the Bankruptcy Code was entitled to a claim for future-rent damages against the debtor, even though the lessor had entered into a nearly identical substitute lease. The Court concluded that efforts to mitigate damages by the lessor would not be considered in reducing the actual damage claim when those efforts failed to reduce the actual harm suffered by the lessor.
In COR Route 5 Co. v. Penn Traffic Co.1 (In re Penn Traffic Co), the United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit held that a non-debtor party to an executory contract may not, by fulfilling its contractual obligations post-petition, deprive the debtor of its ability to reject an executory contract.
In a recent decision of the United States Bankruptcy Court for the District of Delaware, In re Federal Mogul Global, Inc., No. 01-10578 (JKF) (Bankr. D. Del., Mar. 19, 2008) (click here to read the decision), the court ruled that the assignment of rights in certain insurance policies to an asbestos trust was valid and enforceable under the Bankruptcy Code, and anti-assignment provisions in the policies and applicable state law were preempted.
On July 17, 2008, in Phar-Mor, Inc. v. McKesson Corp. (Nos 05-4525/4526), the Sixth Circuit affirmed the Northern District of Ohio's ruling that a vendor's administrative expense priority on its reclamation claim survives, even after the goods that are subject to reclamation are sold and the proceeds are used to satisfy a secured creditor's superior claim. Full text of the opinion.
Facts
On April 9, 2008, in the M. Fabrikant & Sons, Inc. bankruptcy case pending in the Southern District of New York, Chief Judge Stuart M. Bernstein held that a seller of bank debt under the standard LSTA claims transfer documents transfers all of its rights except for those explicitly retained, including unmatured contingent claims, thus giving broad construction to the term “Transferred Rights” under the standard LSTA trade documents.
The Ninth Circuit held on July 3, 2008, that an oversecured creditor’s claim for payment was entitled to a “presumption in favor of the loan agreement’s default rate (an additional 2% interest), subject only to reduction based upon any equities involved.” General Elec. Capt’l Corp. v. Future Media Productions, Inc., 2008 WL2610459, *2 (9th Cir. 7/3/08). Reversing the lower courts, the Court of Appeals held that the bankruptcy court had improperly applied a questionable Ninth Circuit precedent when denying the lender a default rate of interest. Id., at *4.
The November/December 2007 issue of Insolvency Notes featured an article highlighting a Manhattan-based federal bankruptcy court's refusal to officially recognize proceedings commenced in the Cayman Islands to liquidate two Bear Stearns-managed hedge funds that collapsed in June of that year.