The Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit recently held that a bankruptcy court did not have jurisdiction to hear a chapter 11 debtor's breach of contract and tortious interference claims, which the debtor filed after its chapter 11 plan had been confirmed and substantially consummated. Valley Historic Limited Partnership v. Bank of New York, No. 06-1571,___ F.3d ___, WL 1439734 (4th Cir. May 17, 2007). This decision delineates the limits of bankruptcy court's jurisdiction over claims filed by the debtor after plan confirmation.

Background

On Friday, March 3, 2006, Dana Corporation and certain of its affiliated companies (collectively, “Dana") filed for protection under Chapter 11 of the Bankruptcy Code in New York. None of Dana's foreign incorporated affiliates are included in this bankruptcy petition and as such, any transaction with such affiliates should continue in the normal course. However, as a result of the bankruptcy filing, an automatic stay is in effect prohibiting creditors from seeking to take action to collect any amounts due to them from Dana which arose prior to the filing of the bankruptcy petition.

On March 15, 2007, with Jones Day’s assistance as bankruptcy counsel, FLYi, Inc. (“FLYi”), Independence Air, Inc. (“Independence”) and their affiliated debtors (collectively, the “Debtors”) obtained confirmation of their chapter 11 plan under the “cramdown” provisions of the Bankruptcy Code. The plan, which become effective on March 30, 2007, will distribute approximately $150 million to unsecured creditors. In ruling on confirmation of the plan, the U.S.

The ability to borrow money during the course of a bankruptcy case is an important tool available to a chapter 11 debtor-in-possession (“DIP”). Often times, the debtor’s most logical choice for a lender is one with an existing pre-bankruptcy relationship with the debtor. As a condition to making new loans, however, lenders commonly require the debtor to waive its right to pursue avoidance or lender liability actions against the lender based upon pre-bankruptcy events.

“Give ups” by senior classes of creditors to achieve confirmation of a plan have become an increasingly common feature of the chapter 11 process, as stakeholders strive to avoid disputes that can prolong the bankruptcy case and drain estate assets by driving up administrative costs.

When a retail business becomes a debtor in bankruptcy, it often decides to trim its operations by closing some of its retail stores. This strategy inevitably leaves the debtor with unnecessary leases. Instead of simply rejecting the leases, retail debtors often assume the agreements and assign them to other entities. The assumption and assignment of the unnecessary leases may allow a debtor to avoid potentially significant rejection damage claims from landlords.

The Fourth Circuit, on June 15, 2007, affirmed the dismissal of a Chapter 11 reorganization petition filed by a tenant debtor in a commercial lease dispute. Maryland Port Administration v. Premier Automotive Services, Incorporated (In re Premier Automotive Services, Incorporated), ___ F.3d ___, 2007 WL 1721951 (4th Cir. 6/15/07).

The U.S. Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit has held that the bankruptcy court’s exclusive jurisdiction to dispose of estate property did not preclude the enforcement of an arbitration provision.

In re Foamex Int’l, Inc., et al.,1 the United States Bankruptcy Court for the District of Delaware held that the damage cap contained in section 502(b)(6) of the Bankruptcy Code applies not only to rental payments, but also to damages from the breach of any lease covenants, including maintenance and repair obligations. In doing so, the Court reduced a specific landlord’s claim and recovery by more than $700,000 and established precedent that could diminish the claims of landlords in other cases pending and filed in Delaware.

Background

Equitable mootness is a doctrine grounded in equity pursuant to which an appeals court will dismiss an appeal of a bankruptcy order — even if effective relief could conceivably have been granted — because the implementation of such relief (e.g., the reversal of a bankruptcy court order) would be inequitable to third parties. This doctrine may be applied to achieve the necessary finality of bankruptcy orders and decisions that is required to effectuate the successful, expedient reorganization of debtors in bankruptcy.2