Tuesday evening, the Plaintiffs in the Illinois Class Action litigation filed motions with the U.S. Bankruptcy Court in Dallas asking that court to terminate the temporary stay it recently granted to Mt. Gox. They also asked that Robert Marie Mark Karpeles (the Foreign Representative for Mt. Gox) be ordered to provide testimony under oath in the United States regarding the Chapter 15 filing.
Without question, the bedrock of bankruptcy, particularly a successful one, is consent. Indeed, the notion of consent is threaded throughout the Bankruptcy Code and related law in respect of diverse issues ranging from the authority of the bankruptcy court to preside over certain matters, to confirmation of plans of reorganization.
In its first bankruptcy decision of 2014 (October Term, 2013), the U.S. Supreme Court held on March 4, 2014, in Law v. Siegel, No. 12-5196 (Mar. 4, 2014) (available athttp://www.supremecourt.gov/opinions/13pdf/12-5196_8mjp.pdf), that a bankruptcy court cannot impose a surcharge on exempt property due to a chapter 7 debtor's misconduct, acknowledging that the Supreme Court's decision may create "inequitable results" for trustees and creditors.
Debt exchanges have long been utilized by distressed companies to address liquidity concerns and to take advantage of beneficial market conditions. A company saddled with burdensome debt obligations, for example, may seek to exchange existing notes for new notes with the same outstanding principal but with borrower-favorable terms, like delayed payment or extended maturation dates (a "Face Value Exchange"). Or the company might seek to exchange existing notes for new notes with a lower face amount, motivated by discounted trading values for the existing notes (a "Fair Value Exchange").
In In re Fisker Automotive Holdings, Inc., 2014 BL 13998 (Bankr. D. Del. Jan. 17, 2014), leave to app. denied, 2014 BL 33749 (D. Del. Feb. 7, 2014), certification denied, 2014 BL 37766 (D. Del. Feb. 12, 2014), a Delaware bankruptcy court limited a creditor's ability to credit bid its debt in connection with the sale of a hybrid car manufacturer's assets.
In Re: Katherine Elizabeth Barnet, No. 13-612 (2d Cir. Dec. 11, 2013) [click for opinion]
Section 510(b) of the Bankruptcy Code provides a mechanism designed to preserve the creditor/shareholder risk allocation paradigm by categorically subordinating most types of claims asserted against a debtor by equity holders in respect of their equity holdings. However, courts do not always agree on the scope of this provision in undertaking to implement its underlying policy objectives. A New York bankruptcy court recently addressed this issue in In re Lehman Brothers Inc., 2014 BL 21201 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. Jan. 27, 2014).
Until recently, the creditor of a chapter 7 debtor whose debts were not primarily consumer in naturewas unable to rely on Eleventh Circuit precedent to support its position that its debtor's chapter 7 bankruptcy case should be dismissed for bad faith.
A recent bankruptcy court decision denying a royalty owner's motion for summary judgment is highly relevant to any investor that currently owns a term royalty interest or is considering such an investment. The United States Bankruptcy Court for the Southern District of Texas found in NGP Capital Resources Co. v. ATP Oil & Gas Corp. (In re ATP Oil & Gas Corp.), No. 12-3443, 2014 Bankr. LEXIS 33 (Bankr. S.D. Tex. Jan.
Much to the chagrin of golf course lenders, bankruptcy and appellate courts around the country have consistently held that a properly-perfected mortgage or security interest in golf course revenues, including cart rentals and green fees, is not sufficient to grant the lender an interest in the golf course’s “cash collateral” if the business ends up in bankruptcy*. The result is that those revenues can be spent by the golf course borrower in the bankruptcy case to cover its administrative or operating expenses over the objection of the lender.