The United States District Court for the District of Delaware, on July 21, 2014, held that an indenture trustee’s late filing of senior claims did not waive the lenders’ contractual subordination rights, reversing the bankruptcy court. In re Franklin Bank Corporation, 2014 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 98327 (D. Del. July 21, 2014). Nor did the senior trustee’s late filing show inequitable conduct warranting equitable subordination of the tardily filed senior claims to timely filed junior claims.
House bill H.R. 2533 was introduced three years ago with much fanfare by the then Chairman of the House Judiciary Committee. H.R. 2533 proposes amending “title 28 of the United States Code with respect to proper venue for cases filed by corporations under chapter 11 of title 11 of such Code.” It is intended to reduce the number of jurisdictions available for filing a bankruptcy case by effectively eliminating a debtor’s “place of incorporation” as a venue option.
As we noted last month, the U.S. Supreme Court’s unanimous decision in Executive Benefits Insurance Agency v. Arkison, Case No. 12-1200, 573 U.S. ___ (2014), affirmed the constitutional authority of bankruptcy courts to issue proposed findings of fact and conclusions of law to federal district courts in connection with “Stern claims”.
One topic we regularly write about on the Bankruptcy Blog is releases – especially third-party releases. In fact, as recently as Thursday, we wrote about third-party releases. The topic of third-party releases is often controversial, and circuits disagree about the extent to which they are permissible, if at all.
Discounted cash flow analysis is a mainstay among the valuation methodologies used by restructuring professionals and bankruptcy courts to determine the enterprise value of a distressed business. Despite its prevalence, the United States Bankruptcy Court for the Southern District of New York recently concluded the DCF method was inappropriate for the valuation of “dry bulk” shipping companies.
Lenders should be aware of a recent Bankruptcy Court decision that barred a lender from obtaining certain costs when it did not comply with a notice requirement in a mortgage.
On June 5, 2014 the United States Bankruptcy Court in In re Demers, BR 13-11539, 2014 WL 2620961 (Bankr. D.R.I. June 5, 2014) ruled that it is inequitable to shift the costs of a creditor’s error in proceeding with the foreclosure process to the debtor when the creditor sent an unspecific and unclear notice and consequently was not entitled to proceed.
Mortgage litigators often face a variety of bankruptcy issues. There are three main chapters of bankruptcy that affect the average mortgage litigator: Chapter 7, Chapter 13 and Chapter 11. Upon the filing of Chapter 7, Chapter 13 and Chapter 11 by a borrower, the bankruptcy code provides for a bankruptcy automatic stay. The automatic stay provides that all judicial or administrative proceedings or actions against a borrower must immediately stop. This includes all foreclosure actions, eviction actions and general state court litigation against a borrower.
The inclusion of third-party releases in plan of reorganization can be a particularly contentious aspect of the plan confirmation process. Debtors seeking such releases typically face opposition from affected creditors and scrutiny from bankruptcy courts that consider such releases prone to abuse.
When an oversecured creditor forecloses on a debtor’s property after the automatic stay has been lifted, does the Bankruptcy Code (as opposed to state law) govern recovery of attorney’s fees and other amounts from the sale proceeds? Does the bankruptcy court have jurisdiction over the distribution of such proceeds? In Goldsby v.
In this week’s Alabama Law Weekly Update, we share with you two decisions from the 11th Circuit Court of Appeals. The first concerns non-competition agreements and the second deals with FDCPA violations in bankruptcy cases.
Dawson v. Ameritox, LTD, No. 14-10084 (11th Cir. July 10, 2014) (holding that non-compete agreement was void under Ala. Code § 8-1-1, where employee signed the agreement four days before his employment officially began).