The Powerhouse CVA, which sought to strip away guarantees provided by the parent company to landlords of Powerhouse, has been struck down as unfairly prejudicial by the High Court. However, certain aspects of the judgement remain unclear and could be subject to future appeal…

BACKGROUND TO THE POWERHOUSE CVA

Powerhouse (an electrical retailer) proposed a CVA on 1 February 2006 with the intention of closing 35 of its stores (the Closed Premises).

The bank took a charge on the borrowers’ property. In January 1992, it demanded payment of the balance due under the secured facilities. In June 1992, it made a further formal demand specifically relying on the mortgage. One of the borrowers was subsequently made bankrupt. Periodically, the bank informed the borrowers that they continued to be liable and made demands for payment and referred to the mortgage.

The claimant obtained a judgment against the defendant for breach of a guarantee. The defendant entered into an IVA with his creditors, which included his liability to the claimant. The defendant paid the judgment sum to the claimant, but not the interest awarded on it. The claimant contended that the award of interest was a post-IVA claim, and threatened to bankrupt the defendant which would lead to a termination of the IVA. The defendant applied for a stay of execution of the interest part of the judgment, on the ground that it was within the IVA.

Although this case is about a trustee in bankruptcy’s fight to realise his interest in a property by virtue of a debtor’s bankruptcy, the facts (though extreme) are not untypical of a finance company’s position when a hirer refuses to return goods to it despite the fact the court has ordered the hirer to do so.

In this case Mr Canty was made bankrupt in relation to a relatively small debt and he never accepted the position. There followed a number of appeals and challenges over the following years in which he attempted to reopen and relitigate earlier proceedings.

In an important decision for commercial property landlords, the High Court in Prudential Assurance Co Ltd and Others v PRG Powerhouse Limited and Others has ruled that a CVA (defined below) cannot operate so as to prevent landlords from enforcing a parent company guarantee. The Court's decision however was reached on the basis that to determine otherwise would have been "unfairly prejudicial" to the landlords.

Freakley v Centre Reinsurance International Company & Ors [2006] UKHL 45

This case concerns whether a claim to reimbursement of claims-handling expenses should have priority over other creditors on insolvency of the insured.

On 2 March 2007 the High Court handed down the first decision on whether non-domestic rates are payable by an administrator as an expense, and in priority to his remuneration, under Rule 2.67 Insolvency Rules 1986 ("IR"). The judge determined that rates in respect of occupied business premises are a "necessary disbursement" (Rule 2.67(f) IR) of an administration.

Although it was not argued, the judge also expressed the view that this liability to pay rates incurred during the period of the administration would be unaltered if the property were unoccupied during this time.

In a decision handed down on February 23, the High Court granted a winding-up petition brought by the Financial Services Authority under section 367 of the Financial Services and Markets Act 2000 (FSMA).

The High Court has considered the payment of business rates as expenses in new-style administrations. Business rates in respect of premises occupied by a company during the course of its administration are ‘necessary disbursements’ under rule 2.67(1)(f) and payable as expenses of the administration, as they are in a liquidation under rule 4.218(1)(m). Rates for unoccupied premises would also appear to be payable as administration expenses, although not as liquidation expenses.

The claimant appealed against a decision that her former husband’s one third interest in the matrimonial home vested in his trustee in bankruptcy (the first defendant) free from any rights asserted by her, so permitting an order for possession and sale of the property. The claimant argued that pursuant to a matrimonial consent order made prior to the bankruptcy, she had a right of exclusive occupation of the property until remarriage, cohabitation or death.