The UK's withdrawal from the European Union has created uncertainty around insolvency law. Let's look at how things have changed in the wake of Brexit, and what that means for current and future German insolvency proceedings.
What is the state of play post-transition period?
On 30 July 2020, the UK Insolvency Service published its quarterly insolvency statistics. Notably:
The UK government announced on 26 August 2018 that it will legislate to update the restructuring and insolvency systems, with the aim of the UK retaining the gold standard regime. The reforms are a response to international developments (with countries such as Spain and the Netherlands recently introducing updated insolvency systems) and some domestic corporate collapses which have put the UK system under stress.
The reforms are wide-ranging. Headline changes will include:
Key points
Where the underlying liability on which a bankruptcy order is made is subsequently set aside, the correct remedy is rescission under s.375(1) of the Insolvency Act 1986.
Annulment under s.282(1)(a) is the appropriate remedy when, on grounds existing at the time of making the bankruptcy order, the order ought not to have been made.
The facts
Reports last week of the significant increase in corporate insolvencies and voluntary liquidations in England and Wales for Q2 demonstrate the combined impact of government COVID-19 support being withdrawn, soaring energy and fuel costs, and weakening demand – and are being reflected in the nature of the instructions coming into our global jurisdictions from distressed companies across the globe.
Some 13 years ago, Lehman Brothers' sudden and unexpected insolvency sent ripples across the banking and financial services market, some of which are still felt today.
The Court of Appeal's decision in the consolidated cases of Lehman Brothers Holdings Scottish LP 3 v Lehman Brothers Holdings plc (in administration) and others1 [2021] EWCA Civ 1523 was the latest in a long line of cases seeking to unwind the issues arising from Lehman Brothers' unexpected collapse.
The background
Rayford Homes granted security to two lenders, its trustee shareholder and the Bank of Scotland (BoS). The parties entered into an intercreditor agreement (ICA) using the BoS standard form. In a schedule to that agreement was a definition of the term ‘BoS Priority’ over ‘BoS Debt’ up to a monetary limit. The amount was not filled in, nor was the term ‘BoS priority’ actually used in the ICA.
An English rugby club (an unincorporated association of its members) engaged the services of Barnes Webster & Sons (BWS), a construction company. The club’s treasurer signed the contract, which was witnessed by Davies, the club’s president. The club agreed to pay BWS a fixed price plus additional amounts for certain variations in the work, should they arise. The variations were required, but the club did not pay the £147,000 bill for them that BWS presented. BWS made a demand on Davies personally, which he moved to set aside.
In 2002 a European subsidiary of Lehman Brothers created a complicated synthetic debt structure called Dante, which was intended to provide credit insurance for another subsidiary, LBSF, against credit events affecting certain reference entities, the obligations of which formed the reference portfolio. A special purpose vehicle issued notes to investors, the proceeds of which were used to purchase collateral which vested in a trust. The issuer entered into a swap with LBSF under which LBSF received the income on the collateral and paid the issuer the amount of interest due to noteholders.
Punj Lloyd Ltd (PLL), the ultimate parent of Simon Carves Ltd (SCL), provided 'letters of support' (what would in North America be called 'comfort letters') indicating to the board of SCL that PLL would 'provide the necessary financial and business support to ensure that [SCL] continues as a going concern'. This is precisely what SCL did not do: it went into administration, leaving invoices unpaid and unsecured creditors largely out of luck.