A lender cannot rely on its subjective intent in claiming that an otherwise properly filed UCC termination is ineffective, according to a recent decision by the United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit. Put another way, if a lender authorizes a termination statement, the termination is valid upon filing such UCC-3 even if the authorization was mistakenly given. While this result is not surprising, it does put lenders (and their counsel) on notice to be diligent in reviewing and authorizing the filing of UCC termination statements.
Ring v. First Niagara Bank, N.A. (In re Sterling United, Inc.), 519 B.R. 586 (Bankr. W.D.N.Y. 2014) –
A chapter 7 trustee sought to recover as preferences payments made by the debtor to a lender and proceeds of collateral liquidation received by the lender based on arguments regarding whether UCC financing statements adequately perfected the lender’s security interests.
A “UCC-3 Termination Statement” is commonly used in secured transactions by a secured party to put the world on notice that the perfected security interest referenced in the UCC-3 filing is terminated. On October 17, 2014, the Supreme Court of the State of Delaware, in Official Comm. of Unsecured Creditors of Motors Liquidation Co. v. JPMorgan Chase Bank, N.A.
On October 17, 2014, the Delaware Supreme Court held that under the Delaware Uniform Commercial Code, the subjective intent of a secured party is irrelevant in determining the effectiveness of a UCC-3 termination statement if the secured party authorized its filing.[1]
Background
Most lawyers are generally familiar with the concept of a floating lien under the Uniform Commercial Code. A secured creditor takes a lien in a collateral category that changes from time to time as items are added or subtracted. A common example is a working capital loan, in which financed inventory is produced and sold, then becoming an account, which is collected to provide the funds to produce new inventory. A secured creditor may perfect a lien in the changing mass of inventory and receivables, as each category exists from time to time.
On October 17, 2014, the Delaware Supreme Court entered an opinion holding that a UCC-3 termination statement that is authorized by the secured party is effective to terminate the original UCC filing even though the secured party did not actually intend to extinguish the underlying security interest.1 Because the court determined that the relevant section of Delaware’s Uniform Commercial Code (the “UCC”) is unambiguous and
Intellectual property (“IP”) can act as collateral to be pledged to secure an extension of credit. For example, a company that borrows money from a bank can pledge its patents as collateral for the loan. The bank (referred to as the “secured creditor”) in this case will of course want to make sure that its security interest in the IP can be enforced against the borrower if the borrower defaults on the loan.
What Happens to Your Security Interest in a Debtor’s Intellectual Property in Bankruptcy?
Lenders typically have extensive requirements for what inventory will be deemed “eligible” and included in a borrower’s borrowing base for purposes of determining how much the lender is required to lend. One of those typical requirements is that the inventory be owned by the borrower and located at a borrower location in the United States of America, where it will be subject to the Uniform Commercial Code and amenable to an Article 9 security interest.
For a Throwback Thursday, we often go way back, to cases establishing first principles. This time, however, we travel not so far back, but still to a bygone era, the early 80’s. It was a time when the Bankruptcy Code was still new, and judges could interpret it without the weight of much practice and precedent. Often, these cases present the starting point for familiar interpretations that continued to develop in later years, but other times it’s surprising to see a new interpretive opening that, years later, is not thoroughly explored.
ARTICLE 9 AND THE LIFE OF A UCC FINANCING STATEMENT