The “safe harbor” provisions of the Bankruptcy Code protect firms that trade derivatives, and other participants in financial and commodity markets, from the rigidity that bankruptcy law imposes on most parties. Since their inception in 1982, the safe harbor statutes have gradually grown broader, to reflect a Congressional intent of protecting against secondary shocks reverberating through those markets after a major bankruptcy. The liberalizing of safe harbors traces – and may well be explained by – the rapidly expanding use of derivatives contracts generally.

In re Majestic Star Casino, LLC, F.3d 736 (3rd Cir. 2013), the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit broke from other courts by holding that S corporation status (or "qualified subchapter S subsidiary" or "QSub" status) is not property of the estate of the S corporation's bankruptcy estate. Other Circuits have routinely held that entity tax status is property of the estate.

Following the culmination of two public comment periods spanning more than a year, the Office of the United States Trustee, a unit of the U.S. Department of Justice (the “DOJ”) assigned to oversee bankruptcy cases, issued new final guidelines on June 11 governing the payment of attorneys’ fees and expenses in large chapter 11 cases—cases with $50 million or more in assets and $50 million or more in liabilities.

Chief Judge Loretta A. Preska of the United States District Court for the Southern District of New York affirmed the order confirming SRZ client Quigley Company Inc.’s Chapter 11 reorganization plan on July 30, 2013. As noted in our Alert of June 28, 2013, the plan enables Quigley to emerge from Chapter 11 over the objection of a dissenting creditor class and another group of asbestos personal injury claimants.

Two years ago in Stern v Marshall, the Supreme Court surprised many observers by placing constitutional limits on the jurisdiction of the United States Bankruptcy Courts. The Court, in limiting the ability of a bankruptcy court judge to render a final judgment on a counterclaim against a party who had filed a claim against a debtor’s bankruptcy estate, re-opened separation of powers issues that most bankruptcy practitioners had thought settled since the mid-1980s. While the

A Western District of New York bankruptcy court has held that the safe harbor provisions of section 546(e) of the Bankruptcy Code apply to leveraged buy-outs of privately held securities. See Cyganowski v. Lapides (In re Batavia Nursing Home, LLC), No. 12-1145 (Bankr. W.D.N.Y. July 29, 2013).

In the last two weeks, the Honorable Steven W. Rhodes of the Bankruptcy Court for the Eastern District of Michigan held two important in hearings in the City of Detroit's chapter 9 case, the largest in history.

An important qualifier to the discussion about deaccessioning and the Detroit Institute of Arts is that although DIA is a subdivision of the bankruptcy debtor (Detroit), that debtor is not any old commercial entity.  Rather, Detroit is a municipality, and municipal and state debtors are governed by slightly different rules than private parties.

In Sun Capital Partners III, L.P. et al. v. New England Teamsters & Trucking Industry Pension Fund, No. 12-2312, 2013 WL 3814985 (1st Cir. July 24, 2013), the First Circuit held that a private equity fund could be liable for its bankrupt portfolio company’s withdrawal liability imposed under Title IV of the Employee Retirement Income Security Act of 1974, as amended (“ERISA”) on the basis of the private equity fund constituting a “trade or business” under ERISA’s controlled group rules.