The United States Bankruptcy Court for the Southern District of New York (the “Court”) in Weisfelner v. Fund 1 (In Re Lyondell Chemical Co.), 2014 WL 118036 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. Jan. 14, 2014) recently held that the safe harbor provision of 11 U.S.C.

We recently wrote about the highly controversial decision of the Delaware Bankruptcy Court in In re Fisker Automotive capping a secured creditor’s right to credit bid its $168 million claim at $25 million.[1] The secured creditor immediately appealed to the District Court.[2] As a procedural matter, the secured creditor had an absolute right to have its appeal heard only if the Bankruptcy Court’s ruling was considered a “final order.” If it was not a “final order,” then the District Court had discretion on whether to hear the merits of the appeal. On Feb.

Diaz Reus & Targ LLP scored a stunning victory in the U.S. District Court for the Southern District of New York last week on behalf of the government of Venezuela, obtaining complete and final dismissal with prejudice of a suit brought by Smith Rocke Ltd., a purported creditor in the Lehman Bros. bankruptcy.

The case is Smith Rocke, Ltd. v. Republica Vliviariana De Venezuela, No. 12 Cv. 7316 (LGS)., 2014 BL 20749 (S.D.N.Y. Jan. 27, 2014).

Smith Rocke’s Allegation

The U.S. Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit held on Jan. 27, 2014 that a lender’s acceleration due to a borrower’s payment default did not trigger a prepayment premium. In re Denver Merchandise Mart, Inc., 2014 WL 291920, *1 (5th Cir. Jan. 27, 2014) (“Denver Merchandise”). Affirming the lower courts’ application of state law, the court held that “the plain language of the contract does not require the payment of the Prepayment Consideration in the event of mere acceleration.” Id. at *5.  

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Bankruptcy Court Holds Attorney's Signature on Proof of Claim Form Renders Attorney a Fact Witness to Allegations in Proof of Claim, Waiving Attorney-Client and Work-Product Privileges

The power of an appellate court in the federal system to stay the orders of lower courts or to enjoin conduct that lower courts have refused to enjoin, so as to preserve the appellate court’s jurisdiction to review those orders on ultimate appeal, is clearly established yet infrequently invoked. In addition to other potential sources, the power derives from the All Writs Act, 28 U.S.C.

In a recent decision by the United States Bankruptcy Court for the Southern District of New York, Weisfelner, v. Fund 1, et al. (In re Lyondell Chem. Co.), 2014 Bankr. LEXIS 159 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y.

In Van Sickle, the plaintiffs each owned a royalty interest in a well that was originally leased by Comanche Oil Company, which later assigned its interests to Athens/Alpha Gas Corporation. Alpha later filed for reorganization under Chapter 11 of the bankruptcy code, and the plan was approved without inclusion of the Van Sickles' claims. The Van Sickles sought to hold both companies liable under the doctrine of successor liability for pre-bankruptcy-court-confirmation royalties under the N.D.C.C. § 47-16-39.1, which provides in part:

The U.S. Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit recently held in Drawbridge Special Opportunities Fund LP v. Barnet (In re Barnet), 2013 BL 341634 (2d Cir. Dec. 11, 2013), that section 109(a) of the Bankruptcy Code, which requires a debtor "under this title" to have a domicile, a place of business, or property in the U.S., applies in cases under chapter 15 of the Bankruptcy Code.

The ability to "surcharge" a secured creditor's collateral in bankruptcy is an important resource available to a bankruptcy trustee or chapter 11 debtor in possession ("DIP"), particularly in cases where there is little or no equity in the estate to pay administrative costs, such as the fees and expenses of estate-retained professionals. However, as demonstrated by a ruling handed down by the Third Circuit Court of Appeals, the circumstances under which collateral may be surcharged are narrow. In In re Towne, Inc., 2013 BL 232068 (3d Cir. Aug.