The United States Supreme Court, on June 9, 2014, unanimously held that certain “core” proceedings (e.g., fraudulent transfer suits ) could still be litigated in the bankruptcy court, but only if that court’s proposed fact findings and legal conclusions are subject to de novo review by the district court. Executive Benefits Ins. Agency v. Arkison (In re Bellingham Ins. Agency), 2014 WL 2560461 (U.S. Sup. Court, June 9, 2014).
The recent depression in the maritime shipping industry served as the catalyst for many shipping companies to restructure. During the past few years, a number of foreign-based shipping companies have sought protection from creditors in U.S. Bankruptcy Courts—with varying degrees of success.
In 2011, the Supreme Court decided Stern v. Marshall, 564 U.S. ___, 131 S. Ct. 2594 (2011), which gave voice to the Court’s grave concerns about the constitutional limits of bankruptcy court jurisdiction and raised several questions that have confounded courts and lawyers for three years. Last week, the Supreme Court issued its first follow-up ruling, answering some of those questions and clarifying how bankruptcy courts are to handle so-called Stern claims. Despite that guidance, the opinion leaves several important questions unanswered.
The case of Executive Benefits Insurance Agency v. Arkison (In re Bellingham Ins. Agency), No. 12- 1200, was easily one of the most closely watched bankruptcy cases in many years. Last week’s decision in that case, however, was far less dramatic than some practitioners feared it might be. The Supreme Court answered two important questions regarding the power of bankruptcy courts that it left open three years ago in Stern v. Marshall.
On June 9, 2014, in Executive Benefits Insurance Agency v. Arkison (In re Bellingham Insurance Agency, Inc.),1 a much-anticipated decision, the Supreme Court addressed how bankruptcy courts should adjudicate so-called Stern claims. Stern claims are “core” claims over which bankruptcy courts have statutory authority to enter orders and judgments,2 but which authority the Supreme Court previously held in Stern v. Marshall3 was not permitted (at least with respect to certain issues) under Article III of the United States Constitution.
In Executive Benefits Insurance Agency v. Arkison, Chapter 7 Trustee of Estate of Bellingham Insurance Agency, Inc., — U.S. — (June 9, 2014) (Bellingham), the Supreme Court shed light on how bankruptcy judges must proceed when confronted with claims that they cannot finally adjudicate as non-Article III judges.
The health of the healthcare industry can be summarized as follows: as go federal reimbursement rates, so goes the financial viability of healthcare providers, whether hospitals, nursing homes or medical practices.
The First Circuit held in a recent decision that bankruptcy courts have wide discretion to apply a flexible approach when valuing (and potentially re-valuing) collateral for purposes of determining whether a secured creditor is oversecured and therefore entitled to receive postpetition interest pursuant to section 506(b) of the Bankruptcy Code.
Absolute Priority has regularly covered the impact of the Supreme Court’s decision in Stern v. Marshall on the world of bankruptcy litigation. In Stern, the Supreme Court held that Article III of the United States Constitution prohibits bankruptcy courts from finally adjudicating certain “core” causes of action (often called “Stern claims”), notwithstanding Congress’s explicit grant of such power to the bankruptcy court.