On June 17, 2014, a three-judge panel of the Third Circuit Court of Appeals1 vacated a District Court’s dismissal order and resuscitated a bankruptcy appeal brought by a group of litigation creditors seeking recourse against the debtors post-confirmation.2 The Third Circuit opinion is an important reminder to both debtors and creditors that the doctrine of “equitable mootness” has limits and that confirmation of a plan does not preclude review of post-confirmation actions inconsistent with obligations in the plan.
Lenders should be aware of a recent Bankruptcy Court decision that barred a lender from obtaining certain costs when it did not comply with a notice requirement in a mortgage.
On June 5, 2014 the United States Bankruptcy Court in In re Demers, BR 13-11539, 2014 WL 2620961 (Bankr. D.R.I. June 5, 2014) ruled that it is inequitable to shift the costs of a creditor’s error in proceeding with the foreclosure process to the debtor when the creditor sent an unspecific and unclear notice and consequently was not entitled to proceed.
The July 10, 2014 opinion by the U.S Court of Appeals for the 11th Circuit (Georgia, Florida, and Alabama) in Crawford v. LVNV Funding, LLC held that the act of filing a proof of claim on a time-barred debt is a violation of the Fair Debt Collection Practices Act (FDCPA). This decision could have an impact on providers attempting to work and collect old patient debts.
The United States Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit (the “Eleventh Circuit”) has become the first circuit court to extend sections 1692e and 1692f of the Fair Debt Collection Practices Act (“FDCPA”) to proofs of claim filed in a bankruptcy case, ruling that a debt collector is prohibited from filing a proof of claim on debt that is barred by the applicable state statute of limitation. In Crawford v. LVNV Funding, LLC, et al.
On June 12, 2014, the United States Supreme Court unanimously ruled that Inherited IRAs are not exempt in bankruptcy.
The United States Supreme Court, in the case of Clark v. Rameker, ruled that Inherited IRAs enjoy no special protection in bankruptcy, unlike IRAs created and funded by the debtor. Even though the Bankruptcy Code exempts qualified retirement plans, IRAs and similar "retirement funds," the Court decided that this bankruptcy exemption for retirement funds does not extend to an Inherited IRA.
As we noted last month, the U.S. Supreme Court’s unanimous decision in Executive Benefits Insurance Agency v. Arkison, Case No. 12-1200, 573 U.S. ___ (2014), affirmed the constitutional authority of bankruptcy courts to issue proposed findings of fact and conclusions of law to federal district courts in connection with “Stern claims”.
A chapter 7 trustee successfully sought to avoid a mortgage using his “strong arm” powers on the basis that the mortgage was not properly acknowledged. Once again a mortgagee paid dearly for sloppy execution of a document.
The Eleventh Circuit’s recent opinion in Wiand v. Lee clarifies longstanding issues relating to an equity receiver’s standing to pursue clawback claims for the benefit of the receivership estate under the Florida Uniform Fraudulent Transfer Act (“FUFTA”). See Wiand v. Lee, 2014 WL 2446084 (11th Cir. Jun.
Mortgage litigators often face a variety of bankruptcy issues. There are three main chapters of bankruptcy that affect the average mortgage litigator: Chapter 7, Chapter 13 and Chapter 11. Upon the filing of Chapter 7, Chapter 13 and Chapter 11 by a borrower, the bankruptcy code provides for a bankruptcy automatic stay. The automatic stay provides that all judicial or administrative proceedings or actions against a borrower must immediately stop. This includes all foreclosure actions, eviction actions and general state court litigation against a borrower.
Judge Jed S. Rakoff of the Southern District of New York last week ruled that the U.S. Bankruptcy Code does not permit a bankruptcy trustee to recover foreign transfers. Specifically, Judge Rakoff refused to allow Irving Picard, the trustee of Bernard L. Madoff Investment Securities LLC (“BLMIS”), to recoup monies initially transferred from BLMIS to non-U.S.