On Monday, November 17, 2014, the United States Supreme Court agreed to decide a critical issue for mortgage lenders and secondary market investors, whether Section 506(d) of the Bankruptcy Code allows a Chapter 7 debtor to “strip off” a junior mortgage lien when the outstanding senior debt exceeds the current value of the senior lien. Bank of America, N.A. v. Caulkett, No. 13-1421, 2014 WL 2207208 (U.S. Nov. 17, 2014); Bank of America, N.A. v. Toledo-Cardona, No. 14-163, 2014 WL 3965212 (U.S. Nov. 17, 2014).
Recently, in the case of In re Trump Entertainment Resorts, Bankruptcy No. 14-12103 (Bankr. D. Del. 2014), 2014 Bankr. LEXIS 4439 (Bankr. D. Del. October 20, 2014), the U.S. Bankruptcy Court for the District of Delaware addressed the issue of whether a debtor has the authority to reject an expired collective bargaining agreement pursuant to Section 1113 of the Bankruptcy Code.
Trust preferred securities (TRUPs), the highbred security that counted as Tier 1 regulatory capital but generated tax deductible interest payments, were a favored source of capital for community banks. When the financial crisis hit, many bank holding companies (BHCs) with troubled bank subsidiaries exercised the right to defer interest payments on their outstanding TRUPs for up to five years. Interest continued to accrue during the deferral period, but the deferral was not a default and there was nothing that the TRUPs holder could do but wait.
For years, it has been the rule in the Ninth Circuit that a chapter 11 plan cannot discharge or otherwise affect the obligation of a non-debtor owed to a third party. This view interprets section 524(e) of the Bankruptcy Code, which provides that “the discharge of a debt of the debtor does not affect the liability of any other third entity on, or the property of any other entity for such debt,” to specifically prohibit the permanent release, discharge, or injunction of non-debtors. See
On October 31, 2014, Bankruptcy Judge Kaplan of the District of New Jersey addressed two issues critically important to intellectual property licensees and purchasers: (i) can a trademark licensee use section 365(n) of the Bankruptcy Code to keep licensed marks following a debtor-licensor’s rejection of a license agreement?; and (ii) can a “free and clear” sale of intellectual property eliminate any rights retained by a licensee? In re Crumbs Bake Shop, Inc., et al., 2014 WL 5508177 (Bankr. D.N.J. Oct. 31, 2014).
Most lawyers are generally familiar with the concept of a floating lien under the Uniform Commercial Code. A secured creditor takes a lien in a collateral category that changes from time to time as items are added or subtracted. A common example is a working capital loan, in which financed inventory is produced and sold, then becoming an account, which is collected to provide the funds to produce new inventory. A secured creditor may perfect a lien in the changing mass of inventory and receivables, as each category exists from time to time.
Plans of Adjustment were confirmed recently in each of the landmark Detroit, MI and Stockton, CA bankruptcy cases. Although both cases shared many common legal issues, they took different paths to reach confirmation. Detroit, which resolved its cases by entering into settlements with its major constituents, provides a potential roadmap for future cases but only limited judicial guidance. Stockton provides more judicial precedent. For municipalities and their creditors, however, the lessons learned from the two cases will surely influence future Chapter 9 proceedings.
This article first appeared in the American Bankruptcy Institute, November, 2014.