While section 503(b)(9) claims deserve priority payment over general unsecured claims, they do not provide a basis for stripping a debtor’s defenses in determining the allowed amount of a section 503(b)(9) claim.

Note: Pepper Hamilton LLP serves as co-counsel to the Official Committee of Unsecured Creditors (the Committee) in the ADI case. The views expressed herein are solely those of the authors and not of the Committee.

The U.S. Bankruptcy Court for the Southern District of Florida recently held that a wholly unsecured second mortgage lien may be “stripped off,” even if the property encumbered by the lien is no longer part of the bankruptcy estate due to abandonment by the bankruptcy trustee.

The Bankruptcy Court did not specifically reference the consolidated cases now before the U.S. Supreme Court in Bank of Amer. v. Toledo-Cardona, and Bank of Amer. v. Caulkett, which should resolve the issue of whether a wholly unsecured lien may be stripped off in a Chapter 7 bankruptcy.

Rule 2004 Examination in Bankruptcy

People often enter into agreements through which a person or entity borrows money in exchange for a security interest on property that he or it owns. However, in drafting an agreement which establishes a security interest, it is important to make sure that the document is legally enforceable. The bankruptcy court’s order granting summary judgment in Theresa Bender v. Christopher James, Case No. 14-01001-KKS, ECF No. 50 (Bankr. N.D. Fla. Feb. 11, 2015) demonstrates the importance of making sure that such an agreement contains an adequate description of the collateral.

Field v. Bank of America, N.A. (In re Gibbs), 522 B.R. 282 (Bankr. D. Hawaii 2014) –

A bankruptcy trustee sued a mortgage lender to recover for defects in a prepetition non-judicial foreclosure sale. The lender brought a motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim.  The primary focus of the court was on claims under the state Unfair and Deceptive Acts or Trade Practices (UDAP) law.

“A corporate insider who personally guaranteed” the debtor’s loan was not liable on a bankruptcy trustee’s preference claim when the corporate debtor repaid its lender, held the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit on May 6, 2015. In re Adamson Apparel, Inc., 2015 WL 2081575 (9th Cir. May 6, 2015) (2-1).

A just-issued Court of Chancery decision clarifies, and possibly expands, creditors' rights. In 2007, the Delaware Supreme Court ruled that a corporation's creditors may sue its board of directors for violating its fiduciary duties, but only after the corporation became insolvent, in North American Catholic Educational Programming Foundation v. Gheewalla, 930 A.2d 92 (Del. 2007). While creditors continued to be unable to sue directly, Gheewalla did permit them to file derivative suits in those circumstances.

The U.S. District Court for the Southern District of New York, on May 4, 2015, affirmed U.S. Bankruptcy Judge Robert D. Drain’s decision confirming the reorganization plan for Momentive Performance Materials Inc. and its affiliated debtors.1 The Bankruptcy Court’s decision was controversial because it forced the debtors’ senior secured creditors to accept new secured notes bearing interest at below- market rates.

In Quadrant Structured Products Co. v. Vertin, 2015 WL 2062115 (Del. Ch. May 4, 2015), the Delaware Court of Chancery (Vice Chancellor J. Travis Laster) announced a bright-line standard governing the threshold inquiry of when a creditor can maintain a derivative suit against directors for breach of fiduciary duty. The court held that a creditor need only establish that the company was balance sheet insolvent at the time the suit was filed and that the creditor’s standing will not be extinguished if the company rides back into solvency during the litigation.

Krol v. Key Bank National Association, et al. (In re MCK Millenium Centre Parking, LLC), Adv. No. 14-00392 (N.D. Ill. Apr. 24, 2015)