Ever since the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit decided Zeig v. Mass. Bonding & Insurance Co. in 1928, it has been well-settled that a policyholder can compromise a disputed claim with its insurer for less than the full limits of the policy without putting its rights to excess coverage at risk.

On May 16, 2016, the United States Supreme Court in Husky International Electronics v. Ritz held that the phrase “actual fraud” under section 523(a)(2)(A) of the Bankruptcy Code may include fraudulent transfer schemes that were effectuated without a false representation. Section 523(a)(2)(A) provides that an individual debtor will not be discharged from certain debts to the extent that those debts were obtained by false pretenses, false representations or actual fraud.

Section 523(a)(2)(A) of the Bankruptcy Code allows a creditor to obtain a judgment denying its debtor a discharge of debts incurred by false pretenses or actual fraud. However, if the debt itself was not incurred by actual fraud, but the debtor subsequently transfers his assets with the intent prevent its creditors from obtaining payment, may the creditor still obtain a judgment denying the debtor’s discharge under § 523(a)(2)(A)?

A debtor’s pre-bankruptcy repurchase of its stock for $150 million was not a fraudulent transfer because the debtor “could have sold off enough of its assets or alternatively obtained sufficient credit to continue its business for the foreseeable future,” held the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit on June 15, 2016. In re Adelphia Communications Corp., 2016 WL3315847, *2 (2d Cir. June 15, 2016). Affirming the lower courts, the Second Circuit stressed that “the issue of adequate capitalization,” the “sole issue presented on appeal ...

Claims disputes are “core proceedings” in bankruptcy cases that are subject to the general jurisdiction of bankruptcy courts, subject to exceptions for personal injury tort or wrongful death claims. Under 28 U.S.C.

In a case of first impression, DLA Piper argued before the US Bankruptcy Court for the District of Delaware that a consent provision in a Delaware LLC operating agreement effectively granting a creditor a veto right over a debtor’s decision to file for bankruptcy was void because it was contrary to federal public policy.

Who doesn’t love a good catch-all provision? In a world of infinite possibilities, attorneys often find themselves drafting language designed to encompass a plethora of contingencies. Are such efforts sometimes overkill? Perhaps. Nevertheless, given our imperfect ability to predict the future, such provisions are often necessary and appropriate.

On March 9, 2016, Bankruptcy Judge Shelley Chapman of the Southern District of New York issued her decision on the Debtor’s motion to reject certain contracts in Sabine Oil & Gas Corporation’s Chapter 11 case.^[i] The decision, which allowed Sabine to reject “gathering agreements”

(E.D. Ky. June 16, 2016)

In a 5-2 decision, the Supreme Court of the United States in Commonwealth of Puerto Rico et al. v. Franklin California Tax-Free Trust et al., 579 U.S. ___ (2016), rejected the Puerto Rico Public Corporation Debt Enforcement and Recovery Act (the “Recovery Act”) as preempted by the Bankruptcy Code on June 13, 2016. The practical implication of the decision is that Puerto Rico is currently without options to restructure its billions of dollars in municipal debt, and the only feasible path forward will most likely have to come from Congress.