Rated and other debt issuances are often structured with borrowers that are special purpose entities, whose governance provisions are designed to inhibit bankruptcy filings. A recent District of Delaware bankruptcy court case, while not directly on point, throws into question the premises underlying the efficacy of such provisions.

Facts 

The U.S. District Court for the Middle District of Florida, Orlando Division recently ruled that debtors’ FCCPA and TCPA claims did not arise out of and were not related to their mortgage to fall under the jury waiver provisions in the mortgage where the claims arose out of attempts to enforce a debt that was discharged in bankruptcy.

The Court also ruled the debtors sufficiently stated a claim under FCCPA by alleging the creditor received notice of the debtors’ bankruptcy case to constitute actual knowledge the debtors’ were represented by counsel.

As many investors anticipated, the deep trough in the commodities market over recent years resulted in a number of companies in commodity industries restructuring their balance sheets through a Chapter 11 bankruptcy process. Because companies often reorganize in the midst of a market downturn, a commodity company’s low EBITDA during this time usually results in low values being placed on the company’s reorganized equity.

On October 11, 2016, Chief Judge Brendan L. Shannon of the Delaware Bankruptcy Court issued a letter ruling in which he opined on the appropriate valuation of a first lien. A copy of the Opinion is available here.

(6th Cir. Oct. 12, 2016)

The Sixth Circuit affirms the bankruptcy court’s order denying the creditor’s motion to reopen the case. The debtor’s ex-spouse filed the motion four years after the debtor received his discharge. The ex-spouse argued that an obligation arising out of their divorce proceedings should be declared non-dischargeable. The court holds the bankruptcy court did not abuse its discretion in denying the motion. Opinion below.

Per Curiam

Attorney for creditor: Aaron J. Scheinfield

A recent, and highly publicized, decision from the case formerly known as Sports Authority, In re TSA WD Holdings, Inc. et al., Case No. 16-10527 (MFW), Bankr. D. Del. (Docket #2863, Aug.

Lots of people and companies buy old debt—for example, hedge funds, private equity firms, and even some commercial bank affiliates. Typically, this is debt that the original creditor has charged off and sold for a fraction of the legal balance. In some cases, the debt has grown so old that a statute of limitations makes it technically unenforceable. But that doesn’t always stop the debt buyer from attempting collection.

A substantive non-consolidation opinion is a common feature of structured finance transactions in the U.S. Most, if not all, opine as to what a bankruptcy court would do, but express no opinion on the appellate process. We would venture a guess that most opinion recipients assume that if the bankruptcy court gets it wrong, their rights will be vindicated on appeal. The Eighth Circuit opinion in Opportunity Finance¹ casts a troubling shadow over that assumption.

Background

In a recent decision in In re Packaging Systems, LLC, the Bankruptcy Court for the District of New Jersey ruled that a lender that held a “super-priority” administrative expense claim under section 364(c)(1) of the Bankruptcy Code was still entitled to its super-priority status even after the debtor’s case converted to chapter 7.

A recent opinion issued by the United States District Court for the Northern District of Illinois reminds us that corporate veil-piercing liability is not exclusive to shareholders. Anyone who is in control of and misuses the corporate structure can be found liable for the obligations of the corporation. The facts of this case, however, did not support personal liability for veil-piecing.