Slide Rules and Hula Hoops – Business Obsolescence and Bankruptcy

(Bankr. E.D. Ky. Jan. 6, 2017)

The bankruptcy court overrules the creditor’s objection to confirmation of the Chapter 13 plan. The creditor argued its claim, secured by the debtors’ mobile home, should be increased by the cost of delivery and set-up of the home. The court holds that set-up and delivery costs may not be used as a means to increase the replacement value as a matter of law. Opinion below.

Judge: Wise

Attorney for Debtor: Daryle M. Ronning

Attorneys for Creditor: McBrayer, McGinnis, Leslie & Kirkland, Zachary A. Horn

In this installment of “To Cap or Not to Cap,” which was previously featured on Weil’s Bankruptcy Blog in May of 2015 (see here), we reviewed a recent decision from the United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit. In Kupfer v.

The U.S. Court of Appeals for the First Circuit recently affirmed a bankruptcy court’s ruling that a mortgagee did not violate the discharge injunction in 11 U.S.C. § 524(a) by sending IRS 1099-A forms to borrowers after their discharge, agreeing that the IRS forms were not objectively coercive attempts to collect a debt.

A copy of the opinion in Bates v. CitiMortgage, Inc. is available at: Link to Opinion.

Ruden McClosky, P.A. (“Ruden”), a formerly large and prestigious law firm that was founded in 1959 and at its peak had more than 200 attorneys commenced a bankruptcy case by filing a petition for Chapter 11 relief (“Petition”) in the United States Bankruptcy Court for the Southern District of Florida on November 1, 2011. The firm was a victim of the changing economy and the Great Recession. Ruden’s practiced largely in areas serving financial institutions and real estate developers—areas particularly hard hit by the recession.

(Bankr. E.D. Ky. Jan. 6, 2017)

What can a lender do about successive bankruptcy filings by a borrower? What can lessors do when their tenants file successive bankruptcy petitions? A recent decision by a bankruptcy court in the Eastern District of New York gives guidance on these questions.

(6th Cir. B.A.P. Jan. 4, 2017)

The Sixth Circuit B.A.P. affirms the bankruptcy court’s decision and order denying the trustee’s request for turnover of funds paid to the debtor’s criminal defense attorney. The debtor’s mother had made the transfer from a bank account held jointly with the debtor. The trustee failed to meet the burden of proving by a preponderance of the evidence that the attorney fee was property of the estate, and thus turnover was inappropriate. Because the debtor had no claim to the fee, the trustee had no claim for turnover. Opinion below.

Last week, the United States Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit ruled that a PRP’s bankruptcy settlement of its CERCLA liability did not bar that PRP from later seeking contribution for a share of the settlement – despite the bankruptcy court’s determination that the settlement represented the PRP’s “fair share” of CERCLA liability.

A decision rendered during the sometimes peaceful interlude between Christmas and New Year’s is worth reading, and heeding. Hurston v. Anzo (In re Hurston), Adv. Proc. No. 15-2026 (Bankr. N.D. Ga. Dec. 27, 2016) is a helpful reminder to anyone representing lenders or creditors which are hell-bent-for-leather to pursue a non-dischargeability claim against a debtor that submits a false written statement (e.g., a personal financial statement) to obtain credit.