On March 22, 2017, the Supreme Court of the United States decided Czyzewski v. Jevic Holding Corp., 580 U.S. __ (2017), holding that a bankruptcy court may not use a structured dismissal of a chapter 11 case to approve a distribution scheme that violates the absolute priority rule. In many middle-market cases, chapter 11 debtors had used this tool to get deals done and reorganize, despite their inability to confirm a chapter 11 plan.

In a highly anticipated bankruptcy opinion, the United States Supreme Court, in Czyzewski v. Jevic Holding Corp., held that courts may not approve structured dismissals providing for distributions that deviate from the priority rules prescribed in the Bankruptcy Code, absent consent of the affected creditors.

We at the Bankruptcy Cave are not very surprised by the ruling yesterday in Czyzewski v. Jevic Holding Corp. The Supreme Court in Jevic reviewed a Bankruptcy Court’s decision to approve a settlement (with a distribution of proceeds that contravened the Bankruptcy Code’s priority scheme) in conjunction with dismissing the bankruptcy case of the Chapter 11 debtor Jevic Holding Corp.

Yesterday, the Supreme Court issued is highly awaited ruling in Czyzewski et al. v. Jevic Holding Corp. et al. The Jevic case presented the question whether bankruptcy courts may approve non-consensual structured dismissals that vary the distribution scheme established by the Bankruptcy Code.

A potential threat to the Code’s priority scheme is the allowance of “structured dismissals,” which include a settlement as part of the dismissal of the chapter 11 case that would distribute estate assets in a manner that contravenes the Code’s priority rules.

This second installment of our series, “The Life Settlement Industry – Bankruptcy Issues”, will address two related issues:

(1) What type of interest (if any) does an investor-creditor have in a “life settlement” (i.e., a life insurance policy sold by the original owner to a third party for a value in excess of the policy’s cash surrender value, but less than its death benefit), and (2) How is the interest of an investor-creditor in a life settlement generally determined in a bankruptcy case?

On March 22, 2017, the United States Supreme Court held that bankruptcy courts cannot approve a “structured dismissal”—a dismissal with special conditions or that does something other than restoring the “prepetition financial status quo”—providing for distributions that deviate from the Bankruptcy Code’s priority scheme absent the consent of affected creditors. Czyzewski v.Jevic Holding Corp., No. 15-649, 580 U.S. ___ (2017), 2017 WL 1066259, at *3 (Mar. 22, 2017).

Section 523(a)(2) of the Bankruptcy Code is clear that a debtor can discharge a debt for money obtained by a false statement respecting the debtor's financial condition unless that statement is in writing. What has not been clear is whether a debtor's false oral statement regarding a single asset is a "statement respecting the debtor's financial condition" that falls within the ambit of 523(a)(2)(A). If so, debts obtained by such a false oral statement would be dischargeable. If not, then creditors could seek to have such fraudulently obtained debts excepted from discharge.

We previously wrote about the U.S. Supreme Court’s decision to hear a group of truck drivers’ challenge to the dismissal of a chapter 11 bankruptcy case that was designed to avoid paying the drivers’ claims. Today, the U.S. Supreme Court issued its decision in Czyzewski v.

Czyzewski v. Jevic Holding Corp., No. 15-649 (2017)