A fundamental principle of bankruptcy law provides that similarly situated creditors are to be treated similarly. That concept seems straightforward, but applying it in today’s complex corporate restructuring environment is not, as was illustrated in the reorganization of Peabody Energy Corporation (“Peabody” or “the Company”).
Being inexperienced can contribute to getting into disciplinary trouble, but it can also be a mitigating factor in a bar disciplinary case. That’s the message of a recent opinion of the Oklahoma Supreme Court, which imposed a six month suspension from state practice as reciprocal discipline on a lawyer who had already been suspended from federal bankruptcy court practice for five years.
Raising the risk?
The 2005 amendments to the Bankruptcy Code included the addition of an administrative expense claim for the value of goods received by the debtor in the 20 days prior to the bankruptcy filing. The allowance of an administrative expense priority—which generally garners payment in full—for a prepetition claim was a break from tradition and a significant boon to suppliers of goods. For that same reason, however, debtors have had an incentive to fight against the magnitude of such claims in any way possible.
The Bankruptcy Appellate Panel of the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit recently held that the bankruptcy court lacked subject matter jurisdiction under the Rooker-Feldman doctrine to void the foreclosure of a mortgage lien that was executed by the debtors before bankruptcy, but recorded while the automatic stay was in effect.
When a defaulted borrower files a bankruptcy petition, two important events occur: (1) a bankruptcy “estate” comprised of certain assets of the debtor is created; and (2) all collection efforts (and pending litigation) against the debtor or its assets are automatically stayed. Accordingly, the court’s determination of whether items are or are not property of the debtor and of the bankruptcy estate is of critical importance to the creditor’s ability to collect on its debt.
Despite a modest uptick in recent years, it is still a relatively rare occasion for the Supreme Court of the United States to tackle issues involving bankruptcy. This term, however, the Supreme Court has granted certiorari in two bankruptcy appeals that could have important consequences for the financial community. In FTI Consulting, Inc. v. Merit Management Group, LP, the Court will define the parameters of the safe harbor of Bankruptcy Code section 546(e), which excludes certain financial transactions from the debtor’s avoidance powers. In PEM Entities LLC v.
In an era when goods or materials often originate from suppliers or manufacturers outside the United States, bankruptcy courts are grappling with when “receipt” of goods occurs for the purpose of 503(b)(9) claims.
The U.S. Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit recently held that section 707(b) of the Bankruptcy Code, which allows a bankruptcy court to dismiss a chapter 7 petition if it finds that relief would be an “abuse” as defined in that section, applies to a petition initially filed under chapter 13 and converted to chapter 7.
A copy of the opinion is available at: Link to Opinion.
The Sixth Circuit Court of Appeals recently took up the controversial issue of whether a liquidating trustee’s lawsuit, alleging breach of fiduciary duty against a corporate debtor’s officers, falls within the “insured-versus-insured” exclusion of the debtor’s liability policy. See, Indian Harbor Insurance Company v. Clifford Zucker in his capacity as Liquidating Trustee for the Liquidating Trust of Capitol Bancorp Ltd. and Financial Commerce Corporation, 2017 FED. App. Nos.
Exculpation provisions in operating agreements must be carefully crafted in order to protect members, managers, directors and officers for breaches of fiduciary duties. In In re Simplexity, LLC, the Chapter 7 trustee sued the former officers and directors (who were also members and/or managers) for failing to act to preserve going concern value and exposing the debtors to WARN Act claims. The defendants argued the exculpation language in the operating agreements shielded against breach of fiduciary duty liability.