On February 27, 2018, the Supreme Court handed down a unanimous opinion, authored by Justice Sotomayor, resolving a Circuit split over the interpretation of Section 546(e) of the Bankruptcy Code, the “safe harbor” provision that shields specified types of payments “made by or to (or for the benefit of)” a financial institution from avoidance on fraudulent transfer grounds.

On February 27, 2018, a unanimous Supreme Court held in Merit Management Group, LP v. FTI Consulting, Inc. (link here) that an otherwise-avoidable transfer is not subject to the safe harbor in Section 546(e) (which provides, in relevant part, a trustee may not avoid a transfer that is a “settlement payment . . . made by or to (or for the benefit of) a . . . financial institution” or that “is a transfer made by or to (or for the benefit of) a . . .

February 25, 2018

Treasury Issues Report on Dodd-Frank Orderly Liquidation Authority

Treasury Issues Report Recommending Adoption of Reforms to Dodd-Frank Orderly Liquidation Authority and a New Chapter 14 of the Bankruptcy Code for Significantly Systemic Financial Companies

SUMMARY

Judge Swain’s decision in the PROMESA Title III bankruptcy proceeding of the Puerto Rico Highways and Transportation Authority (“PRHTA”) that a federal bankruptcy court cannot compel a municipal debtor to apply special revenues to post-petition debt service payments on special revenue bonds has generated controversy and caused some market participants to question whether, if the decision is upheld by the First Circuit on appeal, the perception that special revenue bonds have special rights in bankruptcy remains justified.

In Mission Product Holdings Inc. v. Old Cold LLC (In re Old Cold LLC), 879 F.3d 376 (1st Cir. 2018), the First Circuit held that a sale in possible violation of the Supreme Court’s Jevic decision does not allow an appellate court to examine the merits of the sale when the sale-approval order otherwise is statutorily moot under section 363(m).

Fallbrook Technologies Inc., along with three affiliates and subsidiaries, has filed a petition for relief under Chapter 11 in the Bankruptcy Court for the District of Delaware (Lead Case No. 18-10384).

On February 13, 2018, the Florida Supreme Court accepted jurisdiction in an appeal emanating from a hot button issue in contested foreclosures – can the borrower in a foreclosure secure an award of contractual attorney’s fees after successfully defending the foreclosure on the basis that the lender lacked standing to enforce the mortgage contract?

Last week, President Trump unveiled his proposal to fix our nation’s aging infrastructure. While the proposal lauded $1.5 trillion in new spending, it only included $200 billion in federal funding. To bridge this sizable gap, the plan largely relies on public private partnerships (often referred to as P3s) that can use tax-exempt bond financing.

The Circuit Courts of Appeal have split on whether a prepetition transfer made by a debtor is avoidable if the transfer was made through a financial intermediary that was a mere conduit. Today, the Supreme Court unanimously resolved the split by deciding that transfers through “mere conduits” are not protected. This is a major (and adverse) decision for lenders, bondholders and noteholders who receive payments through an intermediary such as a disbursing agent.

The Superior Court of Pennsylvania recently affirmed a trial court’s order granting a title insurance company summary judgment based on a defect that a survey of the premises would have shown. SeeKreider v. Correia, 2018 WL 359285 (Pa. Super. Ct. Jan. 11, 2018). In the case, the plaintiff insured purchased a property after the lender had obtained it via a foreclosure (the “Property”). Before plaintiff purchased it, the real estate agent informed him that the Property included a two-car garage and some other surrounding land.