Two courts have added to the murky case law addressing a bankruptcy trustee’s ability to recover a debtor’s tuition payments for their children. In Geltzer v. Oberlin College, et al., 2018 WL 6333588 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. Dec. 4, 2018), a New York Bankruptcy Judge permitted a trustee to claw back payments that parents made to their financially independent adult children for college-related costs. In Pergament v. Brooklyn Law School, et al., 2018 WL 6182502 (E.D.N.Y. Nov.
On December 3, the First Circuit (Judges Torruella, Thompson and Kayatta) heard another appeal emanating from the much-litigated federal Promesa legislation enacted in 2016 addressing Puerto Rico’s restructuring (i.e., essentially bankruptcy). A LOT of money is involved – Puerto Rico’s public debt exceeds $70 billion. So each side brought out big guns. You may have heard of two lawyers arguing in this matter: Ted Olson and Donald Verrilli. Here’s the argument.
Almost every year amendments are made to the rules that govern how bankruptcy cases are managed — the Federal Rules of Bankruptcy Procedure. The amendments address issues identified by an Advisory Committee made up of federal judges, bankruptcy attorneys, and others. The rule amendments are ultimately adopted by the U.S. Supreme Court and technically subject to Congressional disapproval.
It happens all too often: a company declares bankruptcy and then the company’s bank, vendors, or other creditors are forced to return a payment that the company made before declaring bankruptcy because the payment was a “fraudulent transfer” under the bankruptcy code. When that happens, the creditor typically files a proof of claim in the bankruptcy case to recover its payment. To succeed, the creditor must show that it provided some benefit to the debtor in exchange for its payment.
According to the International Trademark Association (“INTA”), “whether a debtor-licensor can terminate a trademark license by rejection, thereby ‘taking back’ trademark rights it has licensed and precluding its licensee from using the trademark” is “the most significant unresolved legal issue in trademark licensing.” It likely will not stay unresolved for much longer; on October 26, 2018, the United States Supreme Court granted a petition for certiorari to resolve this specific issue as part of the Mission Product Holdings Inc. v. Tempnology LLC case.
David’s Bridal, Inc., along with three affiliates and subsidiaries, has filed a petition for relief under chapter 11 in the Bankruptcy Court for the District of Delaware (Lead Case No. 18-12635).
Although it may be difficult to define precisely what an “executory contract” is (with the Bankruptcy Code providing no definition), I think most bankruptcy lawyers feel how the late Supreme Court Justice Potter Stewart famously felt about obscenity--we know one when we see it. Determining that a patent license was executory in the first place was an issue in the Fifth Circuit’s recent decision in RPD Holdings, L.L.C. v.
In Claridge Associates, LLC, et al. v. Anthony Schepis (In re Pursuit Capital Management, LLC), Adv. P. No. 16-50083 (LSS) (Bankr. D. Del. Nov. 2, 2018), the Honorable Laurie Silverstein held that a chapter 7 trustee was authorized to sell the right to pursue fraudulent conveyance claims to third parties, pursuant to section 363 of the Bankruptcy Code. In doing so, the Court extended the Third Circuit’s holding in Official Committee Of Unsecured Creditors of Cybergenics Corp. v. Chinery, 330 F.3d 548 (3d. Cir. 2003) (en banc) to chapter 7 cases.
The United States Supreme Court has agreed to address “[w]hether, under §365 of the Bankruptcy Code, a debtor-licensor’s ‘rejection’ of a license agreement—which ‘constitutes a breach of such contract,’ 11 U.S.C. §365(g)—terminates rights of the licensee that would survive the licensor’s breach under applicable nonbankruptcy law.” The appeal arises from a First Circuit decision, Mission Prod. Holdings, Inc. v.
On November 8, 2018, Judge Vyskocil of the U.S. Bankruptcy Court for the Southern District of New York issued a decision dismissing the involuntary petition that had been filed against Taberna Preferred Funding IV, Ltd. (“Taberna”), a non-recourse CDO, thus ending a nearly seventeen-month-long saga that was followed closely by bankruptcy practitioners and securitization professionals alike. SeeTaberna Preferred Funding IV, Ltd. v. Opportunities II Ltd., et. al., (In re Taberna Preferred Funding IV, Ltd.), No. 17-11628 (MKV), 2018 WL 5880918, at *24 (Bankr.