Rumors of another recession multiplied as the tumultuous second year of the Trump administration came to a close. Highlights of 2018 included a simmering trade war with China; political upheaval after the House of Representatives was retaken by Democrats in the midterm elections; mayhem in financial markets; and, in December, the beginning of the longest government shutdown in U.S. history, triggered by lawmakers’ refusal to provide $5.7 billion in funding for a U.S.-Mexican border wall.

A federal bankruptcy court for the Southern District of Florida has ruled that the owner of a computer-financing scheme cannot hide behind a bankruptcy filing to shield himself from complying with a contempt order that required him to pay $13.4 million for violating an FTC order.

Both the First Energy Solutions and PG&E bankruptcies have seen proceedings regarding power purchase and similar agreements (PPAs) that raise this question.

Background

Contracts often contain provisions that enable a party to terminate or modify the contract based on the other party's bankruptcy filing, insolvency or deteriorating financial condition. In general, the Bankruptcy Code renders these types of provisions (sometimes referred to as "ipso facto" clauses) ineffective. Specifically, under section 365(e)(1) of the Bankruptcy Code (emphasis added):

Intercreditor agreements between secured creditors are intended to limit the potential for litigation and result in predictable commercial outcomes with respect to recoveries from collateral in enforcement actions and bankruptcies. Despite the extensive drafting efforts of sophisticated counsel to eliminate ambiguities in these agreements, the interpretation of intercreditor agreements has been the subject of substantial bankruptcy litigation.

When a court reaches a decision in a case, the law of the case doctrine generally provides that parties should not be able to relitigate the same issue in that case, and for the court to adhere to its prior decision.1 The doctrine does not, however, apply to every decision a court reaches. Two recent decisions by Judge Elizabeth Stong in the Brizinova chapter 7 cases in the Bankruptcy Court for the Eastern District of New York explore when the doctrine may or may not apply in bankruptcy cases.

On Wednesday, February 20, 2019, the U.S. Supreme Court heard oral arguments for Mission Product Holdings vs. Tempnology, LLC. to decide what it means to “reject” a trademark license agreement in bankruptcy.

Can another vain attempt to mitigate a $1.5 billion mistake provide the occasion for a thorough review of the doctrine of earmarking? It did for Southern District Bankruptcy Judge Martin Glenn in the long tail on the General Motors bankruptcy case.

When a creditor is looming, the debtor may be tempted to give away assets to friendly parties so that the creditor will not have recourse to seize as many assets. This was the impetus behind our laws today that hold such actions as voidable transactions (also known as fraudulent transfers) when the intent behind such actions is motivated by the goal of depriving the creditor of reachable assets, or when such actions render the debtor insolvent or the debtor was already insolvent.

There is nothing quite like obtaining a new customer or getting a new big sale - the prospect of recurring revenue from a new source, the validation of business strategy, or the culmination of a successful negotiation.

However, there is nothing more disheartening than when a new customer is unable or unwilling to pay forthe product you just shipped or services you just provided. Perhaps there is one thing that is worse, when a long-term customer fails to pay.

In the In re FirstEnergy Solutions Corporation bankruptcy cases,[1] the court recently issued an opinion narrowing the number of situations in which a fixed