The Bankruptcy Court for the Northern District of Texas dismissed the National Rifle Association’s (“NRA”) bankruptcy case on May 11, finding that the case was not filed in good faith. In his opinion, Judge Harlin Hale found that there was cause for dismissal because the case was filed “to gain unfair litigation advantage and … to avoid a state regulatory scheme,” neither of which he considered to be a purpose intended or sanctioned by the Bankruptcy Code.
Case Name and Number: Chicago v. Fulton, No. 19-357
Introduction: In an 8-0 opinion issued today, the Supreme Court held that a creditor’s passive retention of property properly seized from a debtor pre-bankruptcy does not violate the automatic stay under 11 U.S.C. § 362(a)(3).
The existing jurisdictional conflict1 between US bankruptcy courts under the Federal Bankruptcy Code and the Federal Energy Regulatory Commission (FERC) regarding required approvals for a debtor in bankruptcy to reject an executory Federal Power Act (FPA)-jurisdictional agreement has also been asserted by FERC with respect to Natural Gas Act (NGA)-jurisdictiona
The first half of 2019 continues a long growth rally for the fund finance market, with fund finance deal volume at Mayer Brown significantly up from last year. This growth occurred despite a three-year decline in the number of final fund closings.1 This apparent contradiction can be explained both by the penetration of traditional subscription credit facilities into a broader range of fund types and the diversification of fund finance product offerings in the market (including a notable uptick in the number of hybrid facility and net asset value credit facility closings).
Intercreditor agreements--contracts that lay out the respective rights, obligations and priorities of different classes of creditors--play an increasingly important role in corporate finance in light of the continued prevalence of complex capital structures involving various levels of debt. When a company encounters financial difficulties, intercreditor agreements become all the more important, as competing classes of creditors seek to maximize their share of the company's limited assets.
Artists have long relied on art galleries to sell their works, and artists and galleries frequently use the legal construct of a “consignment” to facilitate the display and sale of art. In a consignment, the gallery does not acquire title to a work. Instead, the artist (the “consignor”) entrusts the work to the consignee—in most cases a gallery or auction house—for the consignee to sell. If and when an artwork is sold, the gallery pays the artist out of the proceeds of the sale.
Capital call subscription credit facilities (each, a “Facility”) continued their positive momentum in 2013 and had an excellent year as an asset class. As in the recent past, investor (“Investor”) funding performance remained as pristine as ever, and the only exclusion events we are aware of involved funding delinquencies by noninstitutional Investors (in many cases subsequently cured). Correspondingly, we were not consulted on a single Facility payment event of default in 2013.
On April 19, 2012, the Lehman bankruptcy court handed down its decision on the long-pending motion to dismiss filed by JPMorgan Chase Bank, N.A., in response to Lehman Brothers Holdings Inc.’s $8.6 billion avoidance action against it. The action sought to recover the value of collateral taken by JP Morgan in its role as principal clearing bank to Lehman in the run-up to the Lehman insolvency.
On 18 January 2011, the Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation (“FDIC”) issued an interim final rule (the “Rule”) with request for comments regarding certain provisions of Title II of the Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act (“Dodd- Frank Act”). Title II creates the Orderly Liquidation Authority (“OLA”), which is a mechanism under which “covered financial companies” can be liquidated in a uniform fashion rather than under inconsistent insolvency regimes.
Recently, the Second Circuit became the first federal circuit court to rule that the federal government could deny a Paycheck Protection Program (“PPP”) loan to a debtor in bankruptcy solely because of an applicant’s bankruptcy status.[1] Prior to the Second Circuit’s decision in Springfield Hospital, Inc. v.