The United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit, on Oct. 22, 2012, held that $1.6 million in political contributions made to five different political committees by Ponzi scheme defendants between 2000 and 2008 were fraudulent transfers made “with actual intent to hinder, delay, or defraud creditors” under the Texas version of the Uniform Fraudulent Transfer Act. Janvey v. Democratic Senatorial Campaign Committee, Inc., et al., 2012 WL 5207460 ___ F.3d ___ (5th Cir. 2012).

The U.S. Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit, on Dec. 2, 2011, ruled in favor of SRZ client Alfa, S.A.B. de C.V., denying Enron’s petition for rehearing in Enron Creditors Recovery Corp. v. Alfa, S.A.B. de C.V., 651 F.3d 329 (2d Cir. 2011). The court had previously ruled against Enron more than five months ago, holding that its redemptions of commercial paper were “settlement payments” and thus not voidable as preferential or fraudulent transfers under Bankruptcy Code § 546(e), one of the code’s so-called “safe harbor” provisions.

The U.S. Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit, on Dec. 6, 2010, summarily affirmed a bankruptcy court’s designation of a secured lender’s vote on a reorganization plan in a two-page order, effectively enabling the debtor to cram down the lender’s claim. In re DBSD North America, Inc., __ F.3d__, 2010 WL 4925878 (2d Cir. Dec. 6, 2010).1 As a result, the lender who bought all of the debtor’s senior first-lien secured debt at par will be paid only interest over a period of four years before its loan matures. SeeIn re DBSD North America, Inc., 419 B.R. 179, 207-08 (Bankr.

The United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit held on Nov. 5, 2009, that a creditor was entitled to its post-bankruptcy legal fees incurred on a pre-bankruptcy indemnity agreement. Ogle v. Fid. & Deposit Co. of Md., __F.3d __, No. 09-0691-bk, 2009 U.S. App. LEXIS 24329 (2d Cir. Nov. 5, 2009). Affirming the lower courts, the Second Circuit explained that the Bankruptcy Code (“Code”) “interposes no bar . . . to recovery.” Id. at *8-9 (citing Travelers Cas. & Sur. Co. of Am. v. Pac. Gas & Elec. Co., 549 U.S.

The U.S. Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit held on July 15, 2008, that a major creditor with a seat on the debtor’s board of directors and a 10.6% equity interest was not an insider in a bankruptcy preference suit. In re U.S. Medical, Inc., 2008 WL2736658 (10th Cir. 7/15/08).

The Delaware Supreme Court affirmed on May 18, 2007, the Delaware Chancery Court’s dismissal of a breach of fiduciary duty suit brought by a creditor against certain directors of Clearwire Holdings Inc. North American Catholic Educational Programming Foundation, Inc. v. Gheewalla, C.A. No. 1456-N (May 18, 2007).

Whether a creditor may assert a direct claim against corporate directors for breach of fiduciary duty when the corporation is insolvent or in the so-called “zone of insolvency.”

Answer: No.

For the second time in four weeks, a U.S. district court questioned the authority of bankruptcy courts to issue nonconsensual third-party releases as part of a plan of reorganization.

On Oct. 27, 2020, Judge Marvin Isgur for the U.S. Bankruptcy Court for the Southern District of Texas held that (1) a make-whole premium was not interest or unmatured interest and thus not subject to disallowance, (2) a make-whole claim was enforceable as liquidated damages under New York law and (3) the solvent debtor exception survived the enactment of the Bankruptcy Code and the Noteholders were entitled to postpetition interest at the contractual default rate.

“[A] party moving for substantive consolidation must provide notice of the motion to the creditors of a putative consolidated non-debtor,” held the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit on Sept. 9, 2019. In re Mihranian, 2019 WL 4252115 (9th Cir. Sept. 9, 2019) (emphasis added).

“The right of setoff … allows entities to apply their mutual debts against each other to avoid the pointless exercise of ‘making A pay B when B owes A.’” held the Seventh Circuit on Aug. 17, 2018. Berg v. Social Security Administration, 900 F.3d 864, 868 (7th Cir. 2018). But the Bankruptcy Code (“Code”) limits “a creditor’s right of setoff during the ninety-day period prior to the” date of bankruptcy, said the court. Id.