Analyzing the inner workings of the elements required for the securities contract “safe harbor” protection under Section 546(e) of the Bankruptcy Code, the Bankruptcy Court for the SDNY dismissed a complaint seeking to recover approximately US$1 billion in allegedly fraudulent transfers brought against various transferees as part of the Boston Generating Chapter 11 case.
A recent decision out of the District Court for the Southern District of New York may bring greater certainty to the interpretation of what constitutes a “financial institution” in connection with the safe harbor in section 546(e) of the bankruptcy code. The decision, In re Tribune Fraudulent Conveyance Litig., 2019 U.S. Dist. Lexis 69081 (S.D.N.Y. Apr.
Two United States Bankruptcy Judges for the Southern District of New York recently issued a joint opinion addressing common issues raised by motions to dismiss in two separate adversary proceedings – one pending before Judge Bernstein and the other before Judge Glenn (the “Adversary Proceedings”). The Adversary Proceedings were filed by the debtors in two chapter 11 cases, each involving an Anguillan offshore bank – National Bank of Anguilla (Private Banking Trust) Ltd. and Caribbean Commercial Investment Bank Ltd. (the “Debtor Banks”).
In a highly anticipated bankruptcy opinion, the United States Supreme Court, in Czyzewski v. Jevic Holding Corp., held that courts may not approve structured dismissals providing for distributions that deviate from the priority rules prescribed in the Bankruptcy Code, absent consent of the affected creditors.
In a 5-2 decision, the Supreme Court of the United States in Commonwealth of Puerto Rico et al. v. Franklin California Tax-Free Trust et al., 579 U.S. ___ (2016), rejected the Puerto Rico Public Corporation Debt Enforcement and Recovery Act (the “Recovery Act”) as preempted by the Bankruptcy Code on June 13, 2016. The practical implication of the decision is that Puerto Rico is currently without options to restructure its billions of dollars in municipal debt, and the only feasible path forward will most likely have to come from Congress.
What happens when a debtor, whose loan is pooled and securitized, files for bankruptcy? Are payments made to investors recoverable as fraudulent transfers or preferences?
In its recent decision in Meruelo Maddux Properties, Inc.,1 the Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit held that an entity that meets the definition of a “single real estate” debtor under the Bankruptcy Code may not escape the consequences of such designation simply because it is a subsidiary of a group of companies with integrated and intertwined relationships among them. The decision may provide powerful rights not only to lenders to such entities in general, but could significantly enhance the rights of creditors of real estate owning single purpose entities.
The United States Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit on June 2, 2010, sitting en banc, overruled its own precedential holding in Avellino & Beines v. M. Frenville Co. (Frenville), 744 F.2d 332 (3d Cir. 1984), to hold that in the context of asbestos-related tort claims, a “claim” under the Bankruptcy Code arises when an individual is exposed pre-petition to a product giving rise to an injury rather than when the injury manifests itself. JED-WEN, Inc. v. Van Brunt (In re Grossman’s), No. 1563, slip op. at 18 (3d Cir. June 2, 2010).
On 28 June 2021, the English High Court handed down a judgment declining to sanction a restructuring plan proposed by Hurricane Energy PLC, which sought to cram down the dissenting class of shareholders and hand over the control of the company to its bondholders with a debt-for-equity swap diluting the shareholders down to 5% of their existing shareholding. This is the first time that the English court has declined to sanction a restructuring plan (since their introduction almost a year ago in June 2020), and only the fourth time that the cross-class cram down mechanism has been used.
No, says the Delaware Bankruptcy Court in In re Maxus Energy Corp. In Maxus, the defendant, Vista Analytical Laboratory, Inc. (“Vista” or the “Defendant”), a designated critical vendor, sought summary judgement dismissing the preference complaint. The Court denied summary judgement finding that the critical vendor status did not per se insulate Vista from preference actions.
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