On May 31, 2009, approximately 30 days after Chrysler Group LLC and affiliated debtors filed for bankruptcy relief, the United States Bankruptcy Court for the Southern District of New York authorized the sale of substantially all of Chrysler’s assets to “New Chrysler” – an entity formed by Chrysler and Fiat Automobiles SpA and initially majority-owned by Chrysler’s Voluntary Employees’ Beneficiary Association (VEBA) – free and clear of liens, claims and encumbrances under section 363 of the United States Bankruptcy Code (the Fiat Transaction).
NASA defines a black hole as a place in space where gravity is relentless and pulls so much that not even light can get out. And, so it goes with Chicago as it attempts to get out of its pension black hole. The recent Illinois Supreme Court opinion in Jones v. Municipal Employees’ Annuity and Benefit Fund of Chicago, 2016 IL 119618 (Ill. 2016) (“Jones”) may have created a wormhole or way through Chicago’s pension black hole. That way through is collective bargaining, as discussed below.
Did Trump win again? Yes, but this time it was not “The Donald” but was instead the casino-operator Trump Entertainment Resorts, Inc. (“Trump Entertainment”).
When the Supreme Court issued its decision in Baker & Botts L.L.P. v. ASARCO LLC in June, it caused something of a flutter in the bankruptcy community. The decision held that a professional could not recover for the fees it incurred in defending against objections to its fee application.
How far do the Bankruptcy Code’s “safe harbor” provisions extend in the commercial mortgage-backed securitization (CMBS) market? Do these safe harbor provisions protect financial institutions that act merely as conduits for CMBS payments? These questions were addressed recently by the Northern District of Illinois District Court, and the court’s decision provides ammunition for CMBS investors in clawback claims brought by a bankruptcy trustee.
In a split decision issued late last week, the Sixth Circuit overturned a Michigan district court’s disposition of a tort suit from North Carolina arising out of allegedly faulty breast implants. In noting that “a venue transfer is not alchemy,” the court also construed complex choice-of-law issues in light of the Bankruptcy Code.
Under section 365(f)(1), a debtor is permitted to assume and assign leases and executory contracts notwithstanding contractual limitations or “applicable law” that restricts such assignment. However, that broad general authorization begins with the limiting language, “except as provided in subsection (b) and (c) of this section….”
On July 23, in ASARCO LLC v. Union Pacific Railroad Company, et al. No. 13-1435 (10th Cir.), the Tenth Circuit rejected the notion that settlement requirements are different in the bankruptcy context. Section 113 of the Comprehensive Environmental Response, Compensation, and Liability Act (CERCLA), 42 U.S.C.
The Sixth Circuit is one of only five federal appellate courts to institute a bankruptcy appellate panel under 28 U.S.C. § 158(b). (The others are the First, Eighth, Ninth, and Tenth circuits.) As the bankruptcy appellate panel is unfamiliar to many non-bankruptcy attorneys, this post will review the Sixth Circuit’s bankruptcy appellate panel.
The Third Circuit Court of Appeals dealt a blow to secured creditors in its recent decision holding that a debtor may prohibit a lender from credit bidding on its collateral in connection with a sale of assets under a plan of reorganization. In the case of In re Philadelphia Newspapers, LLC, No. 09-4266 (3d Cir. Mar. 22, 2010), the court, in a 2-1 decision, determined that a plan that provides secured lenders with the “indubitable equivalent” of their secured interest in an asset is not required to permit credit bidding when that asset is sold.