The question, “Can we get them to agree not to file bankruptcy in the future?” must be near the top of the list of questions clients most commonly ask their transactions and workout lawyers.

Most lawyers fielding this question are likely to explain that such an agreement is not enforceable under bankruptcy law. Good lawyers then suggest that in certain situations, an agreement for the entry of an order lifting the automatic bankruptcy stay, or an agreement not to oppose a lift-stay motion if the other side files a bankruptcy petition, may be enforceable.

Adjustable rate mortgages began to reset just as the economic outlook for subprime borrowers soured. Defaults on subprime debt inevitably followed. The onslaught of litigation against all players in the subprime lending arena followed just as inevitably.

I. INTRODUCTION

Bankruptcies and restructurings involving partners and partnerships1 raise a number of unique tax issues. While the IRS has provided guidance with respect to a number of these issues, a surprising number of unresolved issues remain. The first part of this outline summarizes the state of the law with respect to general tax issues that typically arise in connection with partner and partnership bankruptcies and restructurings. The balance of the outline discusses tax issues that arise under Subchapter K when troubled partnerships are reorganized.

With the possibility of a major stock brokerage liquidation appearing more likely than it has been in recent periods, the effect of a liquidation on customers and financial counterparties has become of great interest to many of our clients and others.

When an insurer becomes insolvent and is placed in rehabilitation or liquidation, state insurance laws are very clear that reinsurance proceeds owed by the insolvent insurer’s various reinsurers may not be denied or reduced as a result of the insolvency. The insurer’s policyholders, however, may only look to the estate of the insurer for payment of claims. But, what happens in a situation where the insolvent insurer never took on any risk but merely acted as a fronting carrier for the reinsurer?

If you thought, like many, that the Delaware Supreme Court’s decision in Trenwick Am. Litig. Trust v. Billet, 2007 Del. LEXIS 357 (Del. 2007), put the theory of “deepening insolvency” to rest, once and for all, well, think again. A recent decision, George L. Miller v. McCown De Leeuw & Co. (In re The Brown Schools), 2008 Bankr. LEXIS 1226 (Bankr. D. Del. April 24, 2008), from the United States Bankruptcy Court for the District of Delaware shows that “deepening insolvency” endures, albeit in reduced form.

The rapid growth in derivatives as hedging instruments, particularly through equity swaps, credit default swaps ("CDS") and loan credit default swaps ("LCDS"), has challenged fundamental assumptions underlying corporate governance law, federal shareholder disclosure requirements and bankruptcy law. Corporate law has long relied on a "one share one vote" model, which presumes that a shareholder's economic interests in a corporation are inextricably linked to their voting power.

The Ninth Circuit Bankruptcy Appellate Panel has issued a pair of rulings in a case involving high-stakes litigation—with a claim in excess of $230 million, including $3 million in postpetition attorneys’ fees and costs. Beyond the high stakes, the court’s conclusions in Centre Ins. Co. v. SNTL Corp. (In re SNTL Corp.), 380 B.R. 204 (9th Cir. BAP 2007) have far-reaching implications; they are likely to affect a multitude of financing transactions that become entangled in bankruptcy.

The United States Bankruptcy Court for the Eastern District of Michigan has held that postpetition financing did not receive automatic status as an administrative expense claim under section 346(b) of the Bankruptcy Code. Therefore, the creditor could not object to confirmation of the Debtor’s plan on the grounds that all administrative expense claims would not be paid in full. In re Mayco Plastics, Inc., 379 B.R. 691 (Bankr. E.D. Mich. 2008).

A federal bankruptcy court in Florida has addressed an issue of first impression in its district regarding the degree of error necessary to render a financing statement “seriously misleading” under UCC 9-506.

Previously, we have discussed the risks involved in failing to name the debtor correctly on a financing statement. See CRaB Alert, February 2007, p. 14, “Calling Borrower ‘Mike’ Leads To Failure To Perfect.”