This week’s unanimous Supreme Court decision barring the strip off of wholly unsecured junior liens in chapter 7 cases is one of the stranger recent opinions of the Court.  See Bank of America, N.A. v. Caulkett, No. 13-1421, ___ U.S. ___ (June 1, 2015).  While the result is not particularly surprising, what is unusual is that the Court goes out of its way to question its two decades old decision inDewsnup and may even be hinting that it is ready to overrule that decision.  See Dewsnup v. Timm,502 U.S. 410 (1992).

In today’s economic environment, the rights of secured creditors have become a hot topic around the figurative dinner table of bankruptcy professionals.  Inevitably, this conversation includes a discussion of those Bankruptcy Code provisions intended to protect the rights of secured creditors, including:

On May 26, 2015, the United States Supreme Court ruled that Article III of the U.S. Constitution is not violated when bankruptcy courts decide matters with the knowing and voluntary consent of the litigants.  Wellness Int’l Network, Ltd. v. Sharif,No. 13-935 (U.S. May 26, 2015).

How far do the Bankruptcy Code’s “safe harbor” provisions extend in the commercial mortgage-backed securitization (CMBS) market? Do these safe harbor provisions protect financial institutions that act merely as conduits for CMBS payments? These questions were addressed recently by the Northern District of Illinois District Court, and the court’s decision provides ammunition for CMBS investors in clawback claims brought by a bankruptcy trustee.

Section 506(a) of the Bankruptcy Code provides that a creditor’s claim is a “secured claim to the extent of the value of such creditor’s interest in the estate’s interest in such property”—that is, it is a secured claim for an amount equal to the present value of the collateral—and is an “unsecured claim” for the remainder. Section 506(d) provides that, “[t]o the extent that a lien secures a claim against the debtor that is not an allowed secured claim, such lien is void.”

A bankruptcy case^[1] (no surprise) has produced another instructive court ruling on post-acceleration enforceability of a prepayment (make-whole) premium provision contained in a debt instrument. This latest lesson comes via the U.S. District Court for the Southern District of New York, affirming a ruling of that district’s U.S.

The U.S. Supreme Court’s decision in Wellness International Network Ltd. v. Sharif confirms the long-held and common sense belief that “knowing and voluntary consent” is the key to the exercise of judicial authority by a bankruptcy court judge.1 In short, the Supreme Court held that a litigant in a bankruptcy court can consent—expressly or impliedly through waiver—to the bankruptcy court’s final adjudication of claims that the bankruptcy court otherwise lacks constitutional authority to finally decide.

As the market for so-called “unitranche” credit facilities continues to increase, the Delaware Bankruptcy Court had an opportunity recently to answer positively the question of whether bankruptcy courts will enforce the Agreement Among Lenders (“AAL”) (a form of intercreditor agreement) used in such structures.

Today, the Supreme Court issued a decision in Bank of America, N.A. v.

Those words are from Justice Sotomayor’s opinion in the recent decision by the Supreme Court in Wellness International Network, Ltd. v. Sharif, which decision has generated significant press coverage (and blog postings) among bankruptcy practitioners across the country. This author certainly doesn’t intend to add to the noise out there by reciting the facts and procedural history of the case yet again.