Section 547(c)(2) of the Bankruptcy Code excepts from the trustee’s power to avoid preferential transfers any transaction in which the debtor transfers property to a creditor in the “ordinary course of business.” Exactly what constitutes “ordinary course of business,” however, is not a settled question of law. In Jubber v. SMC Electrical Products (In re C.W. Mining Co.), 798 F.3d 983 (10th Cir. 2015), the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit considered whether a first-time transaction between a debtor and a creditor can satisfy the ordinary course exception.
In a recent adversary proceeding in the chapter 11 case involving Ames Department Stores, Inc. (“Ames”), Lumbermens Mutual Casualty Company (“Lumbermen’s”) argued that under the McCarran-Ferguson Act, the issues in dispute between it and Ames should be decided in Illinois state court as part of Lumbermens’ insolvency proceedings.
On January 4, 2016, the United States Bankruptcy Court for the Southern District of New York (the “Bankruptcy Court”) deviated from SDNY precedent and held that, despite the absence of clear Congressional intent, the avoidance powers provided for under Section 548 of the Bankruptcy Code can be applied extraterritorially. As a result, a fraudulent transfer of property of a debtor’s estate that occurs outside of the United States can be recovered under Section 550 of the Bankruptcy Code.
The Bankruptcy and Creditors' Rights Bulletin provides an analysis of legal issues, recent court decisions and significant changes in bankruptcy and creditors' rights law. This edition highlights two key bankruptcy topics that should be of interest to many business clients.
Striking Oil: Mineral Lien Laws that Provide Protection to Oil & Gas Creditors
A federal “secured tax claim takes priority over [a professional’s] claim to fees” in an aborted Chapter 11 case, held the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit on Jan. 26, 2016. In re Anderson, 2016 WL 308590, at *1 (4th Cir. Jan. 26, 2016).
When can a bank be at risk of unknowingly receiving a fraudulent transfer? How much information does a bank need to have before it is on “inquiry notice”? A recent decision from the Seventh Circuit Court of Appeals highlights the risks that a bank takes when it ignores red flags and fails to investigate. This decision should be required reading for all lenders since, in the matter before the Seventh Circuit, the banks’ failure to investigate their borrower’s questionable activity caused the banks to lose their security and have their secured loans reduced to unsecured claims.
Two decisions issued within a day of each other highlight the continuing debate over whether a time barred proof of claim violates the FDCPA and more importantly, whether the Bankruptcy Code preempts the FDCPA. As copycat cases continue to be filed, courts continue to resoundingly reject the rationale ofCrawford v. LVNV Funding, LLC, a decision out of the Eleventh Circuit.
Last June, the Supreme Court issued a ruling in Baker Botts LLP v.
The U.S. Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit recently held that a lender that is on inquiry notice that its security interest in the collateral had been fraudulently conveyed may lose its secured status.
However, the Court also held that the lender's negligence here did not amount to "purposeful avoidance of the truth" sufficient to justify application of the doctrine of equitable subordination, which allows a bankruptcy court to reduce the priority of a claim in bankruptcy.