The failure of debtors to accurately list and value assets in their bankruptcy schedules is certainly not a new phenomenon. Recently, however, we are witnessing an increase in bankruptcy cases where debtors are using clever and deliberate means to omit assets or disguise the true value of their assets in an attempt to thwart recovery by creditors. While the U.S. trustee's or a creditor's remedy for such bad acts is to seek a denial of the debtor's discharge under 11 U.S.C.

At issue in In re Legacy Corp.was the right to allowance and payment as an administrative expense of the professional fees and expenses of the Movant, a holder of a prepetition gift card claim against the Debtors, for his involvement in the resolution and settlement of prepetition gift card holder claims.

As discussed in an earlier post called “Going Up: Bankruptcy Code Dollar Amounts Will Increase On April 1, 2016,” various dollar amounts in the Bankruptcy Code and related statutory provisions were increased for cases filed on or after today, April 1, 2016.

In February 2016, Energy Future Holdings Corp. (“EF”), which obtained confirmation of a chapter 11 plan on December 3, 2015, prevailed at the district court level in related appeals brought by first- and second-lien noteholders of bankruptcy court orders disallowing the noteholders’ claims for make-whole premiums allegedly due under their note indentures. The forum in this hotly contested and long-running dispute has now moved to the Third Circuit Court of Appeals.

Enforceability of Make-Whole Premiums in Bankruptcy

A corporation’s asset sale “was structured [by its insiders] so as to fraudulently transfer assets in order to avoid paying [a major creditor] what it was owed,” held the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit on March 22, 2016. Continental Casualty Co. v. Symons, 2016 WL 1118566, at *6 (7th Cir., March 22, 2016).

Florida’s proceedings supplementary statute (Fla. Stat. 56.29) provides a wide range of collection options to judgment creditors. Over the years, courts inconsistently applied various parts of the statute, which had remained virtually unchanged since its enactment approximately a century ago. The result was widespread confusion among the courts and practitioners concerning how parties were summoned into court, how to commence proceedings, and parties’ rights under the statute.

It always starts so easy. Borrower comes in and wants to borrow money. Lenders want some form of collateral to secure (potentially) a loan and the Borrower happily agrees to provide, or pledge, collateral to secure a loan. Common examples are the Borrower pledging inventory, equipment or receivables (assuming of course there is no real estate to lien with a mortgage). Lender, either internally, or with outside counsel, prepares the necessary security agreement to document the pledge of collateral. This is generally the description of a secured transaction.

Depending on the nature of its business, a debtor may encounter issues associated with the Perishable Agricultural Commodities Act (“PACA”), a statue designed to protect sellers of perishable produce. Recently, in Kingdom Fresh Produce, Inc. v.

A.BACKGROUND

The term “bad boy” guaranty is used in certain circumstances to describe a guaranty to be provided – usually by an individual, not an entity – in connection with, most often, real estate financing.

The original intent of “bad boy” guarantys was to influence the post-closing behavior of a principal of the borrower, in order to discourage bad conduct that would harm the lender’s position and collateral. Traditionally, the triggers for recourse to the borrower and/or guarantor liability were events such as:

1 PGDOCS\6505199.2 2015 Georgia Corporation and Business Organization Case Law Developments Michael P. Carey Bryan Cave LLP Fourteenth Floor 1201 West Peachtree Street, N.W. Atlanta, GA 30309 (404) 572-6600 March 22, 2016 This paper is not intended as legal advice for any specific person or circumstance, but rather a general treatment of the topics discussed. The views and opinions expressed in this paper are those of the author only and not Bryan Cave LLP. The author would like to thank Tom Richey for his continued support, advice and assistance with this paper.