SCHLEICHER v. WENDT (August 20, 2010)

Conseco was a large financial services company traded on the New York Stock Exchange. It filed for bankruptcy in 2002 and successfully reorganized. This securities-fraud claim was filed against Conseco managers who are alleged to have made false statements prior to the bankruptcy. Then-District Judge Hamilton (S.D. Ind.) certified a class. Defendants appeal.

IUE-CWA v Visteon Corporation, 2010 WL 2735715 (3rd Cir July 13, 2010)

CASE SNAPSHOT

Once a company files a Chapter 11 bankruptcy petition (to sell its assets, reorganize or liquidate), Bankruptcy Code § 1114 sets forth a detailed procedure for the employer to follow to modify or terminate certain retiree benefits. Among other things, § 1114 imposes on the employer the burden of showing that the elimination or modification of benefits is necessary to permit reorganization.

On July 13, 2010, a three-judge panel of the United States Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit unanimously held that auto-parts supplier Visteon Corporation could not terminate health and life insurance benefits for approximately 2,100 retirees during its chapter 11 bankruptcy unless Visteon followed the specific requirements laid out in section 1114 of the Bankruptcy Code, even if Visteon would have had the unilateral right to terminate these benefits outside bankruptcy.1 The Court found that a debtor may terminate any retiree benefits in bankruptcy only if,inter alia, the debt

Title II of the Dodd-Frank Act establishes a new non-judicial receivership al-ternative for resolving troubled financial companies that could threaten the stability of the U.S. financial system (“Covered Financial Companies”), as described further below. The Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation (“FDIC”), on October 12, 2010, issued a notice of proposed rulemaking (the “Proposal”) to begin to implement the provisions of Title II.

Deutsche Bank held an under-secured home mortgage from a Chapter 13 debtor. The debtor was in arrears, but wanted to retain possession and control of her home. Thus, in her Chapter 13 plan, the debtor proposed to cure the arrearage, as required by 11 U.S.C. § 1322(e). The problem, however, was that the parties could not agree on the arrearage amount.

Most polls, political pundits, and crystal balls are predicting a larger crowd on the Republican side of the aisle after the midterm elections, potentially giving them a majority in the House and tightening the margin in the Senate. The natural question that follows is what will happen to Dodd-Frank if the composition of Congress changes significantly? Is it possible that with a Republican majority the House may seek to repeal one of the most controversial pieces of legislation enacted by the Obama administration?

The concurring opinion in a recent Third Circuit Court of Appeals case1 suggests that trademark licensees may be able to retain their rights in bankruptcy cases, even if licensors reject the license agreements. The majority did not consider whether the licensee could retain its rights. Instead, the majority held that the trademark license was not an executory contract; therefore, it could not be rejected under the Bankruptcy Code. The majority opinion applies narrowly to circumstances involving perpetual, exclusive, and royalty-free trademark licenses.

Some in Congress would like to see earmarking eliminated completely, but the most you're likely to see are additional reforms to the earmarking process. Both sides of the debate have strong champions who have no interest in giving in to their opponents. At the same time, a coalition of lobbyists and public interest advocates are promoting additional earmark reforms that deserve serious consideration.

Late this summer, the United States District Court for the Northern District of Illinois, Eastern Division, took on an issue of first impression – whether the fraud of one partner can be imputed to an “innocent” partner in order to render a judgment non-dischargeable.